

The University of Chicago

THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN
RECENT PHILOSOPHY

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

1940

By
CARL ARTHUR BERNDTSON

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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PREFACE

The principal aim of this thesis has been to expound the major treatments of the problem of free-will to be found in recent philosophy. The thesis is historical in basis and critical in direction. In point of time the writers treated extend as far back as J. S. Mill, whose time marks the end of Fonsegrive's historical study,¹ and include Jonathan Edwards, who was omitted from that study and deserves some recall to contemporary attention. The criticism has attempted to trace the consequences of the many and conflicting positions dealt with, but has foregone the somewhat arbitrary task of legislating among the various positions when the analysis has been pushed to the point where basic premisses have been found to clash. This has been particularly true in the discussions of value, where I have not attempted a theory of my own in opposition to the many now recognized, and of the self, where I have followed a traditional empiricism without attempting to confute a metaphysical or "intelligible" ego, whose disadvantages I have thought it best to summarize in terms of incommunicability. I have refrained from polemics, and claim no new solution to the problems involved in the freedom of the will. Such claims have been made often enough, and at times have been based on ignorance of the range of problems implied or on neglect of like treatments by earlier writers. The present work has endeavored to overcome such neglect and ignorance by pooling the contributions of recent writers and digesting and comparing them, without regard to school or doctrine.

The procedure followed has had three divisions. The first has considered the generic characteristics of freedom and their application to the loci named below. It has dealt with the role of causation, indetermination or accident, and plural determination in regard to freedom. The second division has isolated the various possible loci of the freedom considered under the heading

¹George L. Fonsegrive, Essai sur le libre arbitre (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1887).

of free-will. Here I have considered the object of volition, or the realization of volition in non-volitional activity; the process of volition, which includes choice among desires and the rise of desires taken singly; and the subject of volition, or self. The problem of freedom may be, and often is, treated in regard to only one of these loci. Without so limiting the problem, I have recognized the degree to which the freedom of one locus may be independent of another. Having dealt in the first chapter with the general traits of possible types of freedom, and in the second with the loci mentioned in respect of their own content and in regard to the presence in them of the generic characteristics of freedom, I have formulated several definitions of freedom at the pre-axiological level. These are the freedom of the object of volition, which means the realization of will in conduct without interference from without the organism, and is compatible with determinism; the freedom of choice, which means the agreement of choice with the empirical character as constituted by the abiding motives of the empirical self, and is compatible with determination of choice by self or by abiding motives; and the freedom of the self, which means the uncaused efficacy of the self in volition. Considering these at the level of definition, without regard to the differential probability of their real status, I have subjected them to the test of axiological criticism in the third division, where it has appeared that the freedom of choice named above is necessary and sufficient to such ethical conceptions as those of value, virtue, obligation, responsibility and moral agency.

In accordance with this process, I have chosen to hold as my major conclusion that a volition is free, and subject to full ethical consideration in the terms just noted, when the volition is determined by the abiding motives of the empirical self. The realization of this volition in conduct is desirable, but not necessary to the freedom. The uncaused efficacy of the motives or of the self is not necessary to the freedom. I have held that this self is known in part to be passive to, or constructed out of, factors of a social or biological level, which in turn may be determined by factors of a physical, electronic level. The freedom here espoused does not imply indeterminism in any degree. This does not necessarily simplify the problem, for it has appeared that the principle of causality has no proof; whence a confidence in determinism might be challenged as well as a belief

in accident. The first chapter has analyzed causation in terms of universal and individual connection, in terms of induction, implication, identity, and force or power. I have held that none of these views of causation is sufficient to demonstrate its reality, but have also pointed to the massive generalizations and uniformities of empirical science in favor of the principle of causality in its universal form. I have further rehearsed the arguments from contemporary physics, which appear to show that indeterminism in the objects of that science has not been demonstrated, either in regard to present being or in regard to the relation of one moment to another. To this support of causation has been added the ethical arguments of writers like Hartmann and Cassirer, who hold that the recourse to apparent indeterminacy is irrelevant, if not damaging, to the true freedom of man. I have accordingly favored a deterministic approach to the problem. It has seemed compatible with, and in some respects necessary to the ethical phenomena of responsibility and virtue. But it does not seem that psychology is ready to assert the caused status of all elements of psychic activity and content, and I have been as unsuccessful as any exact writer in uncovering all the causal links involved in the formation of abiding motives and of individual volitions. I have, therefore, having in mind this difficult position of the causal principle in general as well as in psychology, been unable to show that the present deterministic view of freedom is conclusively sound and impregnable. Where other writers have defined freedom in terms of accident or of indifference or of arbitrary equilibrium and have hoped that such accident might be the case, I have paradoxically, in face of the scientifically respectable acceptance of a deterministic view, hoped for the reality of that determinism. But in negative defense the thesis has uncovered many objections to the indeterministic types of freedom, which have been discussed in the first chapter under the physical argument and under the theory of plural determination; in the second chapter under the heading of accidental choice or of unmotivated choice, in which few people actually believe, and under the name of the intelligible self, whose status as an eternal cause has been attacked; and in the third chapter in respect of the responsibility of the individual and of the power and value of God. These objections to indeterminism would seem to tower over the difficulties of determinism rehearsed above.

I am grateful to Professor Charles Hartshorne for time and encouragement given during the writing of this dissertation, and for insights which have disturbed me subtly and have affected my thinking more deeply than he knows.

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CHAPTER I

CAUSATION AND INDETERMINISM

The problem of free-will is the dual problem of what is free and what is the nature of its freedom. The former phase will be considered in the chapter following this one; and the specific characteristics of its freedom, if any, will be deferred for that consideration. It seems unwise to cast the treatment of the problem of free-will into a number of pervasive categories to be dealt with in serial order, such as determinism, contingency and double determination; for the adequate examination of any one of them will cover ground sufficient for the examination of the others at the same time, whence their separate treatment will involve a good deal of repetition. The crucial locus, which is the will in its several phases, will be examined with regard to its own content, and the formal characters of its causality or non-causality will be allowed to emerge for inspection jointly or separately, as the content may determine. But in this chapter it is appropriate to raise certain questions anterior to those concerning the will specifically. Such are the nature of causality and its negation, the probability of their exemplification in the world at large as distinct from the will, and the issue of their opposition in proposed schemes of dual determination. These problems may be subsumed under the name of the general argument for indeterminism. The conflict of determinism and indeterminism is the most obvious, as well as the most usual, antithesis into which the problem of free will is projected. Its statement here is not meant to bind the ensuing paper to a view of freedom hinging upon this antithesis; whereas its consideration at this point should clarify terms whose application will be inevitable in the treatment of the will itself.

1. The Nature and Existence of Causation

The views of cause, causation or causality which are currently advanced can be classed according as they emphasize the

universal or the individual case, and it will appear that a mediating factor may be found in the conception of force or activity as capable of implementing both classes and perhaps as constituting one of them. Bergson made this sort of division basic to his view of freedom and went on to allot to both types mutually exclusive spheres of existence, as the sequel will show.¹ More recently Taube has considered the same dichotomy, with conclusions less catholic and directed toward the individual case. In brief, Bergson considered a mathematical type of causality to be constituted by universal and necessary connection,² and a dynamic type of causality to consist in an individual efficacy or force which might or might not secure its effect and so could claim neither universality nor necessity.³ And Taube described a confusion between propositions about the general order of nature, which asserted unobserved invariant law, and propositions about observed relations between two particulars, which asserted not law but free activity.⁴ We will consider first the universal type, then the particular.

Causation as universal law has been formulated by Max Planck as the doctrine that a physical law is any proposition of "fixed and absolutely valid connection between measurable physical quantities . . . which permits us to calculate one of these quantities if the others have been discovered by measurement."⁵ Unrestricted to this physical, quantitative locus, the view has been expressed by Russell in these terms: "By a 'causal law' I mean any general proposition in virtue of which it is possible to infer the existence of one thing or event from the existence of another or of a number of others."⁶ In this formulation Russell deliberately omitted the terms cause and effect, which he relegated to a pre-scientific level,⁷ and reference to the temporal

¹Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, trans. F. L. Pogson (London: George Allen & Co., Ltd., 1912), pp. 204-15.

²Ibid., pp. 204-10.

³Ibid., p. 214.

⁴Mortimer Taube, Causation, Freedom and Determinism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936), p. 7.

⁵Max Planck, The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1931), p. 62.

⁶Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1929), p. 231. ⁷Ibid., p. 239.

relation of the terms involved, on the ground that the cause might equally well be after the effect.¹ This procedure indicates the extreme tendency of this type of causality, to emphasize the relation of predictability between the terms, and to minimize or deny any difference in the terms themselves such as might be implied in the antithesis of agent and patient. Mill shared part of this view, in his rejection of the latter antithesis² and in his observation that the effect might be simultaneous with the cause, while refusing to admit that the cause might be after the effect.³ He was thus moved to observe that in his definition of cause, in which he stated that the cause of a phenomenon was the "antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents" on which the phenomenon was "invariably and unconditionally consequent,"⁴ the reference to antecedents and consequents might well be omitted: "Whether the cause and its effect be necessarily successive or not, causation is still the law of the succession of phenomena. Everything which begins to exist must have a cause. . . ."⁵ Whether this widening of the range of the time-relation agrees with Mill's intent in announcing the law of causation must depend on the reference adopted for the term "successive." Mill had found that the laws of space, dealing only with simultaneous phenomena, and laws of number, true of successive phenomena but not relating to their succession, were inadequate.⁶ He needed a law which should relate to the phenomena in their character as successive, and found such a law in causation. It is not implied by his program that the given phenomena causally conjoined should be successive upon one another (i.e., that A should become after B), but that they should be so conjoined with respect to their general character of successiveness, or of becoming (i.e., that A and B should become, and be conjoined). However this may be, the issue will be of no importance until the data of responsibility are examined in a later place. What is fundamental is the agreement of the three views here cited upon the factor of universal connection, such as to allow of prediction.

¹Ibid., p. 245.

²John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (London: John W. Parker, 1851), I, 348-49.

³Ibid., p. 355.

⁴Ibid., p. 352.

⁵Ibid., p. 355

⁶Ibid., p. 336.

The reduction of causality to predictability has been attacked on the ground that miraculous occurrences might be subsumed under such a view and thus be called causal. Margenau considered the "positivistic" view of cause to hold that the causality principle was valid if it was possible for the scientist "on the basis of known laws, to reconstruct the past and to project the future when the present state of the world is completely known."¹ He held that miracles, though admittedly non-causal, have been allegedly predicted, whence they should be called causal.² The answer should take into view the basis of the prediction. In the case of miracles it has not been law, but, let us say, an immediate divine intuition which should read off the everlasting in an eternal present. The positivistic view, as stated by Margenau, holds that the basis is law. The difference in method is crucial, and sufficient to define the difference between miraculous and caused events within the framework of prediction.

More serious is the problem of the existence of causality in this sense. What is stated in the definition is what holds of every case, past and future, while what is given holds at best of the past, and within the past, of that section which has been observed. Experience, taken at a level implying some degree of abstraction and of selective manipulation, yields the "empirical" laws of Mill, and not the invariant causal laws which should explain them. Mill's empirical laws were derivative uniformities between successive phenomena, whose derivation was not known;³ they were got by the method of agreement,⁴ and stated that the phenomena in question could in all observed instances be subsumed under the law in question; but there was no guarantee that the uniformity would hold in other or all cases, for it might be due to separate effects of separable causes which at some time might separate, or the uniformity might be disrupted by counter-acting causes.⁵ The question is: how do we go from the observed uniformity to the universal uniformity? In terms of Mill's logic, the observed uniformity might be tested by the method of differ-

¹H. Margenau, "Meaning and Scientific Status of Causality," Philosophy of Science, I (1934), 139.

²Ibid., p. 140.

³Mill, II, 37.

⁴Ibid., p. 42.

⁵Ibid., pp. 40-41.

ence, which would certainly ascertain the presence of the cause, or it might be corroborated non-experimentally by being related to wider uniformities from which it might be deduced. But the widest uniformity is the law of causation itself, which is to be proved existentially valid; and the method of difference did not demonstrate universal causality in general, but ascertained the particular cause after assuming the general principle.¹

By way of solution, Mill appealed to inductive processes. He held that "induction may be defined, the operation of discovering and proving general propositions."² The process of indirectly ascertaining individual facts was as inductive as that which yielded general truths, but it was not a different kind of induction; it was "another form of the very same process; since, on the one hand, generals are but collections of particulars, definite in kind but indefinite in number; and on the other hand, whenever the evidence which we derive from observation of known cases justifies us in drawing an inference respecting even one unknown case, we should on the same evidence be justified in drawing a similar inference with respect to a whole class of cases."³ The operation in general was "the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times will be true in similar circumstances at all times."⁴

To derive the law of causality and then to apply it, Mill supposed more than one species of induction. Induction by simple enumeration, which generally concluded from uniformity in observed cases to uniformity in all cases,⁵ made it possible to conclude to particular laws of causation governing given classes of phenomena.⁶ From these particular laws of causation, the universal law of causation was inductively inferred.⁷ Then the universal law was applied to the remaining particular observed uniformities, to enable us to construe them as instances of universal uniformities.⁸ Mill was careful to indicate that the inductions were not identical at each step. The universal law was ascertained through

¹Ibid., p. 93.

²Mill, I, 292.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 297.

⁵Ibid., p. 321.

⁶Ibid., II, 97.

⁷Ibid., pp. 97, 101.

⁸Ibid., p. 97.

loose induction of the simple enumerative type;¹ once ascertained, it enabled the use of rigorous induction to be applied to particular uniformities. Accordingly, the sense in which the law of causation was based on induction was not the sense in which the law was the basis of induction. The rigorous type was no radically new kind, but a refinement upon its predecessor, and ultimately susceptible of no better foundation.² If then Mill was guilty of no circle in his statement of the relation of causation to induction, it may be asked what he gained by that statement. If particular causal laws could be got without appealing to the universal law, and the strength of the universal law depended on the strength of the particular causal laws, it would seem better to go directly from the known particular causal laws to any given set of terms under investigation, without the detour through the general law. But Mill held that the general law, despite its origin in the particular laws, was more certain than they.³ His ground for this appears to have been of a two-fold nature: that the particular laws of causation were at times seen to be exceptionable, and would then be held non-causal if confidence in the universal law did not institute a search for other factors whose inclusion would enable the formulation of a wider law without exceptions;⁴ and that the wider the generalization, the safer it was to conclude to its universality from observed cases.⁵ An empirical law having a subject matter so widely diffused that there were no times, places or circumstances which could fail to give an example of either the truth or falsity of the law, yet always indicated the truth of it, could not depend on accidental collocations or on frustrable circumstances, unless it should happen that the former existed at all times and the latter at no time.⁶ Such a law were "an empirical law coextensive with all human experience; at which point the distinction between empirical laws and laws of nature vanishes. . . ."⁷ The principles of number and of geometry, Mill held, were proved by this method of simple enumerative induction alone; and the law of causation, which was

¹Ibid., pp. 98-99.

²Ibid., p. 98.

³Ibid., p. 101.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 99.

⁶Ibid., p. 100.

⁷Ibid.

the widest generalization about successive phenomena as successive, was proved by the same means.¹ Apart from this type of argument, the institution of the universal causal law between the particular causal laws which formed the start, and the particular causal laws which formed the terminus, of the inductive process, might be justified by the doctrine of Mill quoted above, that "whenever the evidence which we derive from observation of known cases justifies us in drawing an inference respecting even one unknown case, we should on the same evidence be justified in drawing a similar inference with respect to the whole class of cases." It is an application of this principle to hold that the transit from particular causal laws to universal causation governing all phenomena is as justifiable as the transit from the same particular causal laws to an additional causal law, although it is no doubt true that the basis from which inference is made in the two transitions is not observed fact, but itself inductively ascertained generalization. But the crucial question of induction does not regard the supposed equality of these transitions, but the justification of what might be regarded as the lesser transition, from the empirical law governing the given set of terms to the causal law governing the same set and all similar instances. To this question Mill gave no satisfactory answer.

Russell likewise based causal law on induction, but viewed induction more hesitantly. He stated the principle in these terms, with a warning that its precise formulation was difficult: "If, in a great number of instances a thing of a certain kind is associated in a certain way with a thing of a certain other kind, it is probable that a thing of the one kind is always similarly associated with a thing of the other kind; and as the number of instances increases, the probability approaches indefinitely near to certainty."² He held that this principle was a sufficient and necessary condition for the extension of causal laws to unobserved cases.³ He did not attempt to validate it, and believed that an attack on the validity of inference to the future could not be countered successfully.⁴ The principle, if true, must be an a priori logical law, independent of experience with regard to proof or disproof.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 99.

²Russell, p. 241.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

At this point the defense of induction becomes most difficult, for a logical a priori is nothing if not an analytic a priori. Synthetic propositions of a universal and necessary character do not enter into logic. The necessity conceded to the theorems of deductive logic is a function of their tautologous character; and the universality of the most basic rules of semi-otic, such as the rules of identity and non-contradiction, is entailed by certain pragmatic decisions governing the use of signs. If this is true, it is impossible to infer from a set of premisses to a conclusion transcending the content of the premisses. It is precisely this that induction does. It may be concluded that for speculative purposes induction has a residue of unintelligibility. This does not mar its practical import, which is based on the fact that prediction from the past to the future cannot be excised from ordinary living. But this pragmatic justification, itself exposed to speculative consideration, also yields the ghost; for the confidence that what has been useful in the past will be useful in the future can be justified no better than confidence concerning the same relation of non-pragmatic contents.

The alternative to this impasse is to construe causality in terms approaching the identity whose denial posed the inductive problem. The attempt of a recent writer to base causality on implication might at first sight seem to tend in this direction. Hawkins considered that if something was known to be valid for all possible instances of a universal, it must be in virtue of something known about that which had the instances.¹ Such intensional knowledge, when referred to general propositions, was knowledge of the conjunction of isolates (a term chosen in preference to such terms as essence, universal, character, etc.).² The conjunction of isolates constituted strict implication.³ Not every implication-proposition was a causal proposition,⁴ for smoke, e.g., implied fire but did not cause it; what was required in addition to implication was a situation in which the implicans was "given in reality," as distinct from being "merely given in thought," relative to the implicate.⁵ Hawkins did not expand

¹D. J. B. Hawkins, Causality and Implication (London: Sheed & Ward, 1937), p. 56.

²Ibid., pp. 56-57.

³Ibid., pp. 75-76.

⁴Ibid., p. 61.

⁵Ibid., pp. 61-62.

this distinction, but it appears that for an implicans to be given in reality in respect of the implicate was for the implicate to be dependent on the implicans.¹ Such dependence was a necessary condition for the causation of implicate by implicans. In the proposition: smoke implies fire; smoke was not "given in reality" relative to fire, and fire did not depend on smoke for its being, wherefore the being of smoke did not cause the being of fire; but the knowledge of smoke was so given relative to the knowledge of fire, and the latter depended on the former, wherefore the knowledge of smoke did cause the knowledge of fire. But the dependence of the one term on the other was not a sufficient condition of causation; the difference between a ground, or term depended upon, which was a cause, and a ground which was not a cause, "seems to consist in the terms of a causal relation being intrinsically fully determinate independently of each other."² Since one of the terms caused the other, and therefore implied it, the proposition asserting implication in this case was not analytic. This was to say that an isolate could of itself be conjoined with another isolate which did not enter into its meaning. Hawkins asserted that such conjunction was possible. Whether the isolates were analytically or synthetically related, the conjunction constituting implication was there, waiting to be noticed provided the isolates were sufficiently present to the mind.³ Such presence was realized in logic and mathematics, but not in sciences dealing with material objects. Accordingly the former had general truths immediately apprehended, while the latter attained to them by experimental investigation. The upshot of this view is that causal relations exist in nature but cannot be directly apprehended because the terms are not present in the right way. Unfortunately, Hawkins did not indicate what the right way was. To refute his view, we should have to secure terms present in the way demanded and show that there is no evidence of their being related in the manner demanded. We cannot secure such presence. But the assurance of this relationship cannot be accepted on faith, which must be the basis of acceptance in lieu of testing. Hawkins asserts the synthetic implication with no evidence save that of his own intuition, which contradicts the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 63.

³Ibid., p. 81.

intuition of others. And it remains to be shown why the terms, in the degree that they are present, do not evince the conjunction called for in a like degree. Again, if neither isolate taken apart from the other yields any evidence of the relation to the other, as Hawkins says, where does the evidence spring from when they are brought together? Our conclusion is that this view, altho it hearkens back to an honorable desire to find an intelligible causal relation between events, does not succeed in showing how the relation can be demonstrated between terms synthetically related or independently concrete.

If the independent concreteness is denied, the transit to identity is enhanced if not completed. A French writer of the last century, whose view of freedom of the will directly depended on the demonstration of objective indeterminism, construed causality in terms of identity. Fonsegrive held that the necessary condition of a necessary conjunction of cause and effect was that the effect retain certain attributes of the cause.¹ Cause as explicative could refer only to elements shared by cause and effect.² The judgment of causality was analytic.³ In the proposition that a house has been built by masons, Fonsegrive considered the analytic character of the proposition to follow from the fact that the proposition merely asserted that forces had been immobilized in the house; whence nothing was asserted to cause the house save what was part of it.⁴ Again, a page of print was caused by several factors illustrating the same principle: by ink because the ink was retained on the page; by the force of the machine, because the force was retained in the page; and by the compositor, because the page kept some of his force, therefore some of his being.⁵ To the extent to which the effect have something not in the cause, the effect would be a product of liberty.⁶ The world had diversity and change, and in consequence could not be exhaustively explained by cause. The upshot was the victory of indeterminism, which got a place with causality in the scheme of the universe. This view need not be combated so far as it is con-

¹George L. Fonsegrive, Essai sur le libre arbitre (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1887), pp. 372-73.

²Ibid., pp. 373-74.

³Ibid., p. 372.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 373.

⁶Ibid., p. 374.

stituted by the definition of causal efficacy in terms of persistence of cause with effect. Its service in calling attention to the anomalous place of thoroughgoing determinism in a world of variety and growth cannot be denied. But it makes no contribution to the explanation of another type of identity, constituted by a constancy of relation between the several terms of the causal relation when the terms are admittedly disparate in content. Such constancy is observed empirically. If we choose to deny it, not on the ground that there is no constancy, but that the terms so conjoined have that relation in direct ratio to their lack of qualitative content, an appeal may be made to Bergson for support.

Bergson's dichotomy, mentioned at the beginning of this section, consisted of a radical distinction between space and duration. Space was a homogeneous medium, quantitative and stripped of quality, whose parts were mutually external and related in one simultaneous, non-successive present.¹ In this locus change went on without regard to duration, which was heterogeneous, qualitative and intrinsically non-quantitative, and constituted of states which succeeded upon each other without distinction from one another.² Part of this view will be analyzed further in the sections on the will; for general purposes the important point is Bergson's application to causality in the physical world. Because the changes occurring in space were independent of duration, the intervals of time between phases of change were also independent. The equations governing our prediction of astronomical phenomena specified a relation between durations, or a number of simultaneities which might occur in equal number altho the interval noted by a being in duration might be lessened.³ A shortening of duration would have no effect on the sequence of the astronomical phenomenon, but would affect the consciousness of a being in duration.⁴ So all foreseeing was seeing, accomplished by the reduction of the intervals of the future while maintaining the relations of the extremities to each other.⁵ Psychology dealt with the intervals, astronomy with the extremities.⁶ A feeling lacking half the number of days would not be the same: it would "lack thousands of impressions which . . . thick-

¹Bergson, pp. 108, 227.

²Ibid., pp. 101-04, 226.

³Ibid., pp. 193-94.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 197.

⁶Ibid., pp. 194-96.

ened its substance and altered its colour."¹ But the astronomer could dispense with the intervals, and bring the distant phenomenon down to the present. Thus his method implied a reduction of causality to identity, in order to get necessity. The principle of identity got its necessity because it bound present to present.² But causality, as binding present to future, would not be necessary, for it was not true that successive moments of real time were bound together.³ The solution was got by eliminating the time, whence succession gave way to inherence, and causality consisted in basic identity.⁴

The acceptance of this view of identity entails the acceptance of the metaphysic inhering in it, with its Spinozistic rejection of temporal factors in causality.⁵ Russell's insistence on the latter, and Mill's need for a law respecting phenomena as successive, cannot be met by the theory. Diversity in the world and "independent concreteness" of cause and effect are ignored. To meet the demands of the temporal locus, which he segregated from the spatial and assigned to conscious beings, Bergson supposed another type of foreseeing. He called it imperfect, as distinguished from the complete prefigurement given in the mathematical culmination of the "foreseeing" discussed in the paragraph preceding. It consisted in the apprehension of an idea whose realization seemed possible but not certain; between the idea and the action realizing it came feelings of effort, "hardly perceptible intermediate processes . . . sui generis";⁶ the transition from idea to effort, from effort to action, was so continuous as to allow of no demarcation of boundaries, whence the future could be said, although imperfectly, to be prefigured in the past.⁷ The effect was not given in the cause, and the cause need not produce the effect; for the cause was of the nature of force, of indeterminate effort which might or might not issue in the act represented.⁸ Then the connection of cause and effect

¹Ibid., p. 196.

²Ibid., p. 207.

³Ibid., p. 208.

⁴Ibid., pp. 208-09.

⁵J. E. Erdmann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (Berlin: Hertz, 1896), II, 55.

⁶Bergson, p. 211.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 214.

was not necessary or universal.¹ In support of this type of causality, Bergson appealed to Greek hylozoism as explaining regular connection by a deus ex machina, and to Leibniz as explaining determinism through the pre-established harmony and not from the dynamic character of the monads.² Thus Bergson secured for temporal process a type of causality emphasizing force, and not claiming extension to the universal case.

It is evident that a different view of force could be put to the service of universal causation, by supposing force to supply the factor of necessity, and thus of universality. As the analysis of the will might show, the naive consciousness favors the idea of identifying force with compulsion, through the conception of the will as either exerting force on its objects, or as being subject to force or constraint from without. The obstacle to the force view of causality is the unintelligibility of force, despite the apparent concurrence of the naive, sensitive consciousness. The Humean denial of any impression or idea of power affirms this conclusion,³ and it may be abetted by such an analysis of the will as that made by Münsterberg and detailed below.⁴ If the implementation of universal causation by theories of induction, of implication or of identity and time fails to yield a firm conception of causality, implementation through the idea of power fails likewise, and on the double count of the difficulties of conceiving of the power in the first place, and of relating it to necessity in the second place.

In defense of the conception of power, it should be observed that it is not necessarily related to necessity, whence the second difficulty falls. Taube went so far as to assert the incompatibility of power and necessity. His definition of causality was couched in these terms:

An event A causes event B, when B results partly from some activity or influence originating in A. I say partly, because there may be other events causally related to B and because there may originate in B some activity not traceable to any prior causes.⁵

This sort of influence was not to be found in the relations of sense-data, but in the relations of inner impressions, as when we

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, 1896), I, 161.

⁴Infra, chap. 11, sec. 2.

⁵Taube, p. 17.

perceive a moment of calm arise out of a moment of anger.¹ The definition of freedom involved underived activity: "A finite existent is said to be free when some degree of its activity, however small, is underived from any other existent."² The idea of determinism negated the idea of freedom, by definition: if A was free, it was not determined, and if it was not determined, it was free. If A determined B, the pair were "necessarily connected in the sense that, given A, it is inconceivable that B shall not follow."³ From these definitions, for which he claimed support in pre-Humean philosophy, Taube inferred several relations between the terms defined. If A was a cause, activity must originate in A; such activity was therefore underived and thus free; whence if A was a cause, A must be free.⁴ Therefore if A was determined, it was not a cause, for it was not free; and the necessity of A, implying its determined status, negated its causality and thus its freedom. The causality of A was in respect of its power, or transmission of energy or influence to its effect; whence power in A signified the originative aspect of A's operation and causality, and therefore negated derived status implied by determinism and necessity. If A was a cause of B, B might yet be free; for B might in part result from neither A nor any other cause, whence its activity would be underived and thus free.⁵ Thus Taube asserted the compatibility of causation with freedom and the incompatibility of necessity and determinism with freedom. In criticism of the assertion of the compatibility it may be objected that B would be free not in respect of the causality of A upon B, which is the crucial point of the antagonism of determinism and indeterminism, but in respect of a residue of B's activity which eludes any causality. If B had no underived activity, but were derived wholly from A, there would be nothing in the causality of A to suggest the freedom of B. It appears that the consistency of causation with freedom, and the inconsistency of determination with freedom in Taube's analysis follow from the application of the term "causes" to cases where A answers to only part of B, and the application of the term "determines" to cases where A answers to all of B. There is nothing in the usual usage of "causation" to suggest its limitation to the first application. Then it is not any causality which comports with the freedom of B, but only the

¹Ibid., p. 155.

²Ibid., p. 28.

³Ibid., p. 33.

⁴Ibid., p. 28.

⁵Ibid., p. 29.

partial causality of A in respect of B. The incompatibility of determinism with freedom results from the simple procedure of limiting determinism to total causality. Again, there is no incompatibility between A's power to determine and its freedom, although that power would, as Taube held, be incompatible with B's freedom. Power or causal efficacy, as originating in A, implies that A in respect of its power is not caused, determined or necessitated; but it does not interfere with the necessitating determination of B by A's power. The determined or necessitated status holds of A's effects to the extent that A's power extends to the effects; although it does not, as Taube saw, hold of A. For if A were determined or wholly caused, it would at best transmit influence; but the idea of power implies the originating of influence. For this reason creatures, if they have but transitive causality, would be without power and without freedom in the sense of underived activity. Power then would belong to God alone. The distinctions Taube set out, which we have tended in part to erase, collapsed in his conception of deity. For Taube, the sole causality of God would mean the necessitating and determining of creatures.¹ In God, causing and determining could be the same, and either of these would rule out the freedom of any entity but God. This seems sufficient to indicate that the agreement of causality and freedom, and the difference between causation and determination, were limited. It would appear that Taube has at best shown that the entity with power is free; this would be granted of any originitive cause, if we could understand its mode of operation; but the relevant problem he has not solved, of reconciling the freedom of an entity in respect of those factors wherein it is passive.

A further defense of the doctrine of causality as power or force may be made indirectly by considering the attempt made by several writers to solve the problem of free-will by discrediting cause as compulsion or force and substituting for it cause as certainty (Edwards), or as uniform connection (Mill) or predictability (Russell) or observed law (Schlick). These men have thought that by so substituting, they could reconcile freedom with causality. The details of the problem belong in a later chapter, but the general case may be stated here. If the new version of

¹Ibid., pp. 33-34.

cause be applied to the object of the will, and the object be supposed caused by an outer agent such as the law of the state, the will will in this phase be not free, whether the causal relation between agent and object be an instance of power or of the substitutes named above. If the application be made to the process of the will, and the will is held to be caused by prior volitions or by pleasure or by any other psychic content, the volition so caused will result as certainly and with the same consequences for freedom, regardless of the type of causality espoused. If one volition has a kind of power or compulsion over another, it will be no more responsible for the other, and determine it no more inalienably, than if it had no compulsion, but were related as an instance of a universal uniformity. The case is made clearer by considering that whether the effected volition is caused by another volition in the same subject, or by a volition in another subject, the causality must be assumed identical in either case, since the theory postulates the unintelligibility or at least the universal falsehood of rival explanations of causality; whence we may indifferently say the causality is of the nature of power, or of predictability or of certainty, without discriminating the one case from the other; yet the writers named would agree in holding that the one case would exemplify freedom, the other its loss. It appears, therefore, that the generic definition of causality should not be invoked in order to substantiate or refute the freedom of the will, since the final decision is made by the covert introduction of specific characterizations of causality which comport with even the opposite of the generic definition espoused.

This conclusion is in harmony with the intent of this section, which has examined types of causality not with the expectation of deducing different solutions to the problem of free-will from different types of causality, but with the purpose of determining whether causality is intelligible to the understanding or congruent with experience. We have seen that where its definition may be considered satisfactory, as in the case of universal or predictable sequence, the problem of its reality is insuperable; and where its reality would seem not incredible, as in the case of power, it is seen to depend on a notion of activity which eludes our systematic grasp. This is not to deny the reality of causation, but rather to question our apprehension of the principles which should explicate or necessitate the reality. Failing such

apprehension, we may turn to a brief view of more specific arguments of the indeterminist, drawn from the physical world.

2. Indeterminism in Physics and Its Applications

In this section the argument of the indeterminist, designed to re-enforce the general but not conclusive scepticism of the preceding section, deals with certain problems of experimental physics. It foregoes the examination of the necessity or contingency of the "ideal forms" of Lossky,¹ which are immanent in the locus of the objects of physics. These forms, which are presumably the objectification of the "laws" of logic and mathematics, appear to be safe from attack by those who might profit from the advance of indeterminism. Leibniz supposed that geometrical and metaphysical consequences were necessitated on the basis of the principle of contradiction, which made their negation impossible; while physical and moral consequences merely "inclined," or had the hypothetical necessity entailed by the divine decision to enact particular physical laws, such as those of motion, because they would better fit in the most perfect world than any alternatives.² More recently Fongsegrive asserted the compatibility of determinism in mathematics with indeterminism in physics and psychology, on the ground that mathematics abstracted from the relation of succession between present and future while physics and psychology did not, whence mathematics would not quarrel with the indeterminateness of the future with respect to the present as long as the present was determined.³ Boutroux assigned a lessening intelligibility to the laws of the various sciences in the order of their increasing concreteness, but felt on a posteriori grounds that mathematics fitted the real.⁴ Lossky supposed the contingency of physical and psychological laws, but asserted the invariance of the "ideal forms" in

¹N. O. Lossky, Freedom of Will (London: Williams & Norgate, 1932), pp. 94-95.

²G. W. Leibniz, Philosophischen Schriften, ed. C. J. Gerhardt (Berlin, 1882), V, 164.

³Fongsegrive, p. 332.

⁴Emile Boutroux, Natural Law in Science and Philosophy (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1914), p. 44.

reality.¹

The present argument also omits the metaphysical critique of the necessity of the laws of physics, as well as the metaphysical justification of that necessity. Bergson's view of space divorced from duration, as noted in the section preceding, was a metaphysical justification. Lossky's theory of the nature of matter is a metaphysical attack. According to Lossky, the ultimate real things were concrete ideal beings, called substantival agents. These agents were subject to the laws of abstract ideal being, such as those of mathematics; but in the sphere of physics they were free: matter was not an independent substance, but a process made up of attractions and repulsions that created impenetrable bulk;² and these processes were not necessary for the substantival agents, who executed them; for they implied a transition from the super-qualitative force of the agent to a qualitative manifestation in action; and the nature of the agent was such as to make it impossible to subsume the transition under a law that it would always occur, even though it occur indefinitely often.³ A further examination of this view, in the more usual Kantian terminology of the intelligible ego, will be made in the next chapter; here it is cited without comment, as an instance of an approach which may be valid, but has not the challenging power of the considerations now to be discussed.

These considerations emerge from the laboratory, and indicate that if the law of causation is subject to qualification, the hunt for the qualification may more profitably be made at the sub-atomic level than in the far stellar spaces which Mill thought might possibly be non-causal. Recent physical inquiry has uncovered evidences of what some observers call uncertainty, and others indeterminacy. The phenomena yielding the evidence are such as these: the apparently undetermined transit of an electron from one circle in the atom to another, which has induced the comparison of the electron's movement with the choice of a human being; the uncertainty as to which of two photo-electric cells will be entered by a single photon, although the ascertainable conditions are identical; the problem of ascertaining the position and velocity of a particle in wave mechanics. If the con-

¹Lossky, pp. 94 ff.

²Ibid., p. 62.

³Ibid., pp. 98-99.

ditions of the entry of the single photon varied, it would be impossible to investigate them without introducing at least one quantum of light, which would disturb the identity of the conditions and deflect the electron: the shorter the wave length of the light used for examination, the clearer would be the discernment of position, but the greater would be the acceleration given to the photon investigated. According to Planck, wave mechanics can define the position of a particle, or of a definite point in "configuration space," only by superposing a group of waves of the system, such that their wave functions should cancel each other by interference and intensify each other only at the point to be ascertained.¹ The complete isolation of the point would require infinitely small wave lengths, therefore infinitely great momentum; whence a reciprocal uncertainty of momentum and position, stated in ". . . Heisenberg's Principle, which states that the product of the uncertainty of position and uncertainty of momentum is at least of the same order of magnitude as the quantum of action."²

Two problems arise: whether to the admitted uncertainty in our knowledge there corresponds a real indeterminateness in the physical world of any present moment, and whether the relation of the physical world at any given moment is likewise indeterminate with respect to any other moment. The second involves the question of inference from the one moment to another, and therefore knowledge of the premisses of the inference, whence we are led back to the first species of indeterminateness, which applies to the premisses to be found in any given moment. It would appear that determinism of the second type would imply determinism of the first type, but not vice versa: the present may be determinate, yet bear an indeterminate relation to the past or future, unless a system of internal relations be assumed between the terms, such as Whitehead supposed, with certain qualifications, to be a possible explanation of law.³ We may investigate the first type of determinism, then pass on to the question of the second.

The factors whose determinateness is at issue are the velocity and position of the moving particle. It is held by some

¹Planck, p. 38.

²Ibid., p. 40.

³A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 143.

philosophic writers that the uncertainty regarding these factors is a function not of their ontological status, but of our methods of knowing them. Miss Konczewska considered that the methods may be improved sufficiently to dispose of the uncertainty,¹ and Wilson held that God knew what the position and velocity were.² If it were the case that instrumental difficulties accounted for the uncertainty, it might also be true that inherent limitations to their sufficient improvement might exist; wherefore no one would ever know whether the instruments or the reality were the prime factor in the uncertainty. As against this inconclusive view, Planck and other writers hold that the difficulty in the ascertainment of position and momentum are inherent in the real situation, at a level independent of measurement. Planck and Margenau held that the difficulty did not arise from an objective indeterminateness, but from the posing of a question in terms of classical physics when dealing with a situation of a kind not amenable to treatment in the terms of classical physics. Planck pointed to the determinateness of the material waves and suggested that the possibility of equating energy with frequency implied that the former practice of localising events in individual parts of space must be abandoned for a practice which should view a physical system as a whole:

According to modern mechanics, each individual particle of the system, in a certain sense, at any one time, exists simultaneously in every part of the space occupied by the system. The simultaneous existence applies not merely to the field of force with which it is surrounded, but also to its mass and its charge. Thus we see that nothing less is at stake here than the concept of the particle. . . .³

In terms directed to an equally deterministic conclusion, Margenau held that quantum mechanics had rather strengthened the concept of causality, by defining the concept of "states" more abstractly.⁴ If these views of Planck and Margenau are acceptable, it is not necessary to accept the analysis of the problem given by Wilson.

¹Helene Konczewska, Contingence, Liberté et la Personnalité humaine (Paris: J. Vrin, 1937), p. 18.

²R. Wilson, "The New Physics--Does It Vindicate Free Will?" The New Scholasticism, XI (1937), 342.

³Planck, p. 28.

⁴Margenau, Philosophy of Science, I (1934), 147.

He held it contradictory to suppose that anything could be ontologically indeterminate with respect to its present status. If it were indeterminate, it would be universal: that is, determinable to more than one individual; but no universal could have ontological existence, for it would then be one, due to its existence, and many, because indeterminate.¹ We may agree with the denial of ontological existence to the universal, since ontological existence is distinguished from being in general by the presence of space and time, which are principles of individuation. But the suspicion of indeterminateness which posed the problem should be examined with the distinction between indeterminateness of existence as existence, and of existence as limited to some character exemplifying the universal. To deny that position or velocity may be determinate is not to deny that the existence as such is determinate; for the character of existence in the ontological order may be such as to allow of determinate existence of determinate characters, without implying that velocity or position must be included among those characters. Only if velocity or position were necessary conditions of ontological existence could the admitted determinateness of ontological existence require the disputed determinateness of the velocity and position. It appears to this writer that Planck and Margenau, in appealing to a new view of the nature of physical states, are denying the necessity of this condition. To sustain their denial they may be forced to reinterpret the nature of ontological existence, or of space and time. There is no objection in principle to this. Bearing in mind Margenau's contention that quantum physics has maintained causality by presenting a more abstract view of the nature of physical states, it is legitimate to suppose that the classical views of velocity and position were particularizations on a derivative level, which level was indeterminate in relation to the more abstract level, and acquired its intrinsic determination from the character of our cognitive processes. It is then clear that the determinateness of the prior level should not be questioned, save as the prior level should be looked at unwittingly through eyes accustomed to the secondary stage; as Planck put it: to raise questions in classical terms about problems which must be posed in quantum terms.

¹Wilson, The New Scholasticism, XI (1937), 344.

The other question, of the determinateness of a second moment in relation to a first, has met with varying answers from philosophers and physicists. Among the former, Dewey believed that causality had been disturbed:

Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is finally known. Moreover, the metaphysics of existence as something fixed and therefore capable of literally exact mathematical description and prediction is undermined.¹

Cassirer held that quantum mechanics had not given up natural law, but had reinterpreted it.² Miss Konczewska felt that the uncertainty was due to disturbances of a mechanical order, subsumable under causal laws describing the action of the intruding photon despite our inability to follow the law in experience: she aptly asked about the justice of referring to a disturbance, if there was no order to disturb.³ Margenau's view of causality was such as to make causality analytically consequent upon the definition of physical states: the "causality postulate reduces to a definition of what is meant by 'state.' It is an agreement to consider those quantities as composing the state of a system which enter into a time-free differential equation describing its behavior."⁴ Such states could be found even in an arbitrary universe, provided the equations were differentiated often enough.⁵ To put a pragmatic limit on the latter process, by a restriction to convenient formulation in equations, automatically restricted the range of the states; "whence a synthetic statement regarding causality could be made, to the effect that states could be found in nature which should satisfy the pragmatic demands governing the mathematical formulations."⁶ Such states Margenau held to have been secured by quantum mechanics.

Planck reiterated this deterministic re-interpretation with an insistence that the search be continued for dynamic laws at the base of statistical laws.⁷ Schrödinger added to the list

¹John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1929), p. 204.

²Ernst Cassirer, Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri, 1937), p. 254.

³Konczewska, p. 19.

⁴Margenau, Philosophy of Science, I (1934), 145.

⁵Ibid., pp. 144-45.

⁶Ibid., p. 146.

⁷Planck, p. 88.

of indeterministic data the problem resulting from the artifice of considering velocity among the initial conditions at one instant, despite the definition of instantaneous velocity in terms implying two moments:

Velocity is defined as a derivative in respect of time:

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = \text{limit} \frac{x_2 - x_1}{t_2 - t_1} \text{ for } t_2 - t_1 \rightarrow 0.$$

This definition refers to two moments of time, not to the state of one moment. It is held that one can choose these two moments as near to each other as one wishes; that they can be allowed to coincide at the limit. Perhaps this is not correct. . . . This seems to be the purport of the modern assertion, that the concept of velocity loses its meaning in sharply defined positions.¹

Then velocity could not strictly be reckoned among the conditions of the instant from which prediction should be made; to include it, observation would have to be extended to a second instant; whence even classical mechanics could not claim the rigorous attainment of its deterministic ideal,² expressed in the form: given "a system of particles, their masses, positions and velocities at one point of time, together with the laws of force expressing their reciprocal influence. Then their motion may be calculated in advance for all future times."³ Notwithstanding this addition to the list of evidences against the determinism espoused by the classical physics, Schrödinger was not willing to surrender it definitely: "One can have achieved ever so great success with indeterministic models. But it will hardly ever be demonstrable that no deterministic model can be found which will do equal justice to the facts."⁴ But Compton was more willing:

Now, Heisenberg tells us, science must abandon its cherished law of causality. His case has been made so convincing that I should consider it more likely that the principle of the conservation of energy or the second law of thermodynamics would be found faulty than that we should return to a system of strict causality.⁵

Compton went on to outline the consequences of this indeterminism,

¹E. Schrödinger, "Über Indeterminismus in der Physik (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1932), p. 9.

²Ibid., pp. 7-8.

³Ibid., p. 2.

⁴Ibid., p. 3.

⁵Arthur H. Compton, The Freedom of Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935), p. 23.

however partial, in the world at large; such that in the case of choice made by a human being, freedom could be conserved in the margin of indeterminateness left to individual choice after statistical laws of physiological and psychological character had contributed their average weight.

The detailed examination of conclusions of this last kind, which extend to the will the consequences of beliefs held about physics, will be deferred to the next chapter. Here it is appropriate to make two sorts of general criticism of such an extension. 1) The first sort governs the premisses of the extension. If causality is abandoned or modified in physics, the determinateness of psychological phenomena may be correspondingly affected on the ground that they are derived from physical phenomena, in the sense that a knowledge of the electrons in the world would yield knowledge of the thoughts and volitions of the beings in the world; or on the ground that, although physical phenomena may not determine psychological phenomena, we may conclude analogically from indeterminateness in the former to indeterminateness in the latter. If the first relation between the two classes of phenomena is true, its truth has not yet been demonstrated, and present speculation about it would be unprofitable for two reasons: one, that our present methods are inadequate to generate so wide a synthesis, and second, that the attainment of such a derivation would take us nowhere until we knew more definitely what was the character of the physical states from which we should begin the reckoning. But if it is true that the positions and motions of the electrons and protons in the body and environment at a given instant should determine the desires and thoughts of the person in question at that instant, it would follow that any assertions made about the person in respect of freedom would have to be traced back to assertions made about the atoms, such that he would have no choice save as the atoms made it, and no ultimate responsibility save as the atoms bore it. If the freedom of man hinged on indeterminateness, or on an original causality at the level of his consciousness, the espousal of the radical determinism in question would answer the question of freewill at this point, with a decisive no. The next chapter will indicate useful definitions of freedom which do not hinge on these factors.

If the derivation of the psychological characters from the physical may be left an open question, it could still be

argued that the psychological laws might share the strict or lax character of the physical laws, according to one's interpretation of the uncertainty phenomena of quantum physics. But it is not clear that the analogy should hold. If the atomic states are undetermined, it might still hold that conscious states are determined; and if the atomic states are determined, it might still be true that the psychic states are not. Peirce was at pains to find in psychic phenomena an adherence to a form of causality which he denied, in his preferred sense of the term, to mechanics.¹ An argument from analogy is no more than its name implies.

It appears, then, that if the extension of the physical argument to the problem of the freedom of the will leaves us with no certain conclusion, either because of the logical insufficiency of the one method or because of the massive knowledge required by the other in conjunction with the uncertainty of strict causality in physics, the issue of this section is not to relieve the scepticism of the preceding section. There we found items of unintelligibility, which were sufficient to make the acceptance of causality not mandatory to the understanding, while not sufficient for the rejection of it. Here we find that physics poses further problems, which add to the uncertainty of any conclusion. If we are determined to disprove freedom of the will, on the ground that everything is caused, we find ourselves without sufficient evidence for the latter ground. If we are determined to prove freedom of the will, on the ground that not everything is caused, and that the will of man may be included among those things which are not caused, we find ourselves again without sufficient evidence. 2) We then come to our second criticism of the extension of the physical argument to the argument about the will. This criticism directs itself to those writers who have appealed to the uncertainty phenomena in particular, and to the general difficulties of causation secondarily, for the sake of extending the non-causality they thought they saw there, to the will itself. A long and powerful tradition in the discussion of freedom has defined freedom in terms of accident, non-causality or contingency, which were supposed to hold at least of the will or the psychic subject, and perhaps of the world in general. Against this tradition there has been another, which has asserted the agreement

¹Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1932), VI, secs. 68-70.

of freedom with causality, but only in the limited sense of the freedom of conduct, as distinguished from freedom of the individual volition or of the subject of volition. What is novel in certain recent treatments of freedom is the insistence that freedom in the wider sense must not be defined in opposition to causality, but in a sense using causality without being identical with it. On this view causality is usually asserted, and freedom built on that foundation; the attempt to invalidate causation in face of the fact of the widely observed uniformities of the world, is given up, in favor of the attempt to validate causation in several spheres, with freedom construed in terms of the relation of the spheres to each other.

Cassirer is an example of this position. In dealing with the argument which would extend the supposed indeterminacy of atomic phenomena to the locus of psychic and ethical phenomena, Cassirer affirmed first the falsity of the supposition of indeterminacy, as noted above; then the uselessness of some of the physical data for a psychological or ethical freedom, even if the data could be related to such freedom. Of a lesser order was his observation that the "choice" of an electron between different circles in an atom could not be compared with choice of a conscious being, which implied consciousness of ends;¹ whence there was no inference from the supposed uncaused nature of the electron's choice, to a similar causelessness or lack of motivating determination in the choice of the conscious being. He joined with Miss Konczewska in pointing to the lack of individuality in the electron. Miss Konczewska cited the connection between contingency, which was supposed present in the uncertainty phenomena, and the individuality of the contingent thing; then indicated that such individuality could not be ascribed to the particle in physics, for the particle lacked two traits of individuality: strict localization in space and persevering individual identity.² Cassirer made an ethical application of the same motif: the questionable individuality of the electron led us further away from the ethical individuality of the Person, from the endurance and unity of "a determinate moral 'character.'"³ Of a more general order, Cassirer held that moral freedom must be no mere possibil-

¹Cassirer, p. 259.

²Konczewska, pp. 23-24.

³Cassirer, pp. 254-60.

ity, no empty potency; it must imply a continuing self-realization, for which the negative concept of indeterminacy did not suffice; what was needed was positive forces, obeying appropriate principles of their own, not derivable from the locus of physics and not contradicting the laws governing that locus, but operating above them.¹ Thus human actions were to be subject to a dual judgment: as events in time they should be causally determined, but their content and meaning should not be exhausted in that determination.² The nature of the first determination was Kantian and critical: "The freedom of the will contradicts a dogmatic fatalism; but it does not by any means contradict a critically conceived and developed determinism."³ The nature of the second determination, which was the second factor in the dual judgment, was of the order of a final cause. It was instanced in Platonic determination by the view of pure ideas, in Spinozistic reason and in Kantian deontology.⁴ In each of these three Cassirer claimed that a basic causality of a different type, evidently for the physical order, was affirmed by the philosopher in question, without disrupting the new determination by the final cause or autonomous will.

On a more extended basis than this, Nicolai Hartmann has also appealed to a concept of freedom which should assert a dual, perhaps a many leveled determinism. He proved the existence of the first type of determinism through the relation of the modalities: the actual must be at least ontologically possible; ontological possibility did not consist merely in lack of contradiction, which was logical possibility, but in the real series of conditions of the possible event; given the series, the possible event could not but exist, and was therefore necessary.⁵ Thus in real being, as Hartmann used that term, the possibility and necessity of the being had a mutual Deckungsverhältnis, and there was nothing ontologically contingent (accidental).⁶ This determinism was necessary for the effectiveness of the second type of determination, which was final or purposive, and involved the will and

¹Ibid., p. 247.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 253.

⁴Ibid., pp. 248 ff.

⁵Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1926), p. 599.

⁶Ibid.

values.¹ The will was not necessitated in its acceptance of values or final causes, either by the values or by a cosmic teleology or by the series of causes operating on the lower level.² This last freedom followed from the application to the two series, to the Kausalnexus and the Finalnexus, of three general laws: the law of strength, according to which the higher series depended asymmetrically on the lower; the law of matter, according to which the lower type was matter or potency for the higher; and the law of freedom, according to which the characteristic traits of the higher type were not derived from the lower, but were radically new and free.³ From the law of freedom it followed that the finality of the second series, being the new characteristic of the series, was not determined by the matter of the first series: physical or biological processes could not dictate values. But from the law of strength, it followed that the second series presupposed the first in respect of the determinate characters of the first. Thus the consideration of ends to be attained involved the idea of means to implement the end; and the enactment of the end involved the realization of each of the means by an appropriate cause of the first series, and the realization of the end by the causal action of the set of means.

Hartmann supposed a good many levels of being, each of which had a novum in relation to the level below it, but singled out for attention the Kausalnexus and Finalnexus mentioned above, and added a third, personal determinant in order to solve certain difficulties created by his Sollensantinomie.⁴ The examination of the third determinant belongs especially in the next chapter, where we shall consider the freedom of the subject of volition. But its addition throws light on the extent and conditions of the program of a positive, plural determination instead of the negative freedom involved in Wahlfreiheit and physical indeterminism. In considering the relation of Final- to Kausalnexus, it would appear from Hartmann's account that a plus of determination was intrinsically desirable, if not universally and categorically necessary;⁵ but in considering the relation of Finalnexus to the Person which chose among conflicting oughts, it is explicitly

¹Ibid., pp. 608-09.

²Ibid., pp. 567, 627.

³Ibid., p. 607.

⁴Ibid., pp. 616-18.

⁵Ibid., pp. 587, 597.

evident that the case is not so, for the Person chose without determination of any kind in the Finalnexus, and therefore exhibited negative freedom.¹ Hence it appeared that the plus of determination was but a concession to the fact that the lower order was already fully determined; where the lower order was not capable of so determining, the higher order might enter into the determination without positive causality, as was the case when the Person ended the impotence of the value series to determine the will, by casting its undetermined vote. In addition to this, it is evident, as Hartmann admitted, that indeterminateness still plays a general role in his freedom, as expressed in the law of freedom stated above.² In that law, the freedom of any level was stated to consist in the measure to which it was a novum undetermined from below, and therefore, we may add, undetermined by anything. It appears then that Hartmann's view does not radically dispose of the function of indeterminism in a concept of freedom, but makes a compromise dictated partly by the blind fact of the presence of certain determinations, and partly by the requirements of a moral being for the enactment in physical form of the carriers of values, of Güterwerte which might need concurring physical laws for their realization.

But if the theory of plural determination does not dispense with indeterminism, it does present it in a light more acceptable to determinism. It is a minimum of indeterminism, such as is meant to be compatible with causality of efficient or physical causes in physics, biology and sociology. It may therefore be considered as a last argument for general indeterminism, even though it has been stated with the opposite intent. It may founder on the relation of final causes or values to efficient causes, which some would not call a relation of freedom. But it would seem, in summary, that if freedom is to be construed in terms involving some degree of indeterminism, this contribution has more prospect of success than a more radical attack on causality in general, which has the empirical sanction of widely observed uniformities to satisfy at least part of its definition, or dependence on the uncertainty phenomena of physics, which are still in process of interpretation, and have an ambiguous if not negative usefulness for the moral demands which any conception of a free will

¹Ibid., pp. 710-12.

²Ibid., p. 610.

should consider. It is these demands in particular which appear to frustrate the usefulness of a pervasive indeterminism, on the ground that responsibility and punishment, which have yet to be examined, imply a causal relation between the responsible entity and the acts for which it is responsible. It remains to be considered whether a pervasive causality will sufficiently account for the freedom morally demanded, or whether a combination of the factors of cause and accident is required. Such consideration implies a more detailed study of the locus primarily involved in the freedom of the will: the will itself, to which we now turn.

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND VALUE

The preceding chapters have referred from time to time to such morally-relevant terms as responsibility and moral agency, and have indicated that these and other terms drawn from ethics will have a decisive influence on the definition of freedom; for of the definitions considered, such as the definitions of freedom as the voluntary, or as choice determined by constant motives or by the self, or as undetermined choice, it is clear that the moralist will choose that one which is best suited to his ethical program. It is then required to analyze the ethical terms in some detail before applying them to the pre-ethical analyses of the preceding chapters; then to make the application to the suggested definitions. A third phase enters in the fact that the definitions considered do not appear to have equal claim to enactment in reality. We can point quite readily to the agreement of conduct with volition in cases where we are not forced by external factors, and to the agreement of volition with abiding factors in the self in cases of carefully weighed choice; but we cannot so well assert the determination of volition, or of an empirical self, by an uncaused self, nor can we so readily assign contingency to individual volitions directly in the sense of the equilibrio arbitrio. In this situation, granting as we have granted, that causality cannot be demonstrated to exist either in physics or in psychology, we may follow James and implement the indeterminism pragmatically as a feature of the empirical world; or we may follow Kant and morally postulate uncaused operation from a metempirical source, while holding to the reign of causality in physics and psychology. This is to make our ethics the basis, not of a mere choice among definitions as in the foregoing, but of a choice among descriptions of reality. If we flee experience entirely in making this second choice, we escape the danger of any refutation which greater knowledge of the empirical world may someday give us. If we remain within the experienced world, we may find that advancing knowledge may somewhat destroy that uncertainty which was the

basis of our choice. The present paper will not attempt this moral implementation of the reality of freedom, either on the empirical or on the metempirical level, since it involves an act of faith which, though irrefutable either wholly or in part, is beyond the efficacy of symbolism and communication. Furthermore, it will appear in the sequel that indeterministic freedom may not be as necessary a condition of value and of its attainment, as some of its defendants suppose.

The analysis of the ethical terms relevant to freedom of the will, and the application of the terms to the definitions considered in the preceding chapters, imply the study of value and morality in themselves, of the conditions of their realization in individual men, and of the conditions of their enactment in the world at large. The first deals with the dependence of value, or of any of its species, on freedom in any of its phases. The second deals with the capacity of men to enact values and with the admitted failure of individuals to so enact; its scope includes the problems of responsibility and punishment and remorse. The third deals with the moral governance of the cosmos, with providence and teleology and the causality of God. The first two belong to ethics proper, the third to theology. The first two overlap considerably, for moral value is defined by some in terms of a free capacity to enact the good, and the subject of moral value is, per corollary, the subject of responsibility. Accordingly no attempt will be made to isolate these two; but their treatment will be divided off from that of the third.

1. The Ethical Problem

Sidgwick held that the problem of free-will was not as important to ethics as some of its students have thought. He put the problem in these terms: whether or not the wrong choice of a wilful wrong-doer was free in the sense that he might have chosen rightly even if the antecedents of the choice were the same.¹ Sidgwick referred to English ethics to show that English moralists preceding Reid had not considered the problem to be important to their ethical systems, and that utilitarian moralists were content

¹Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan & Co., 1913), p. 59.

with determinism.¹ Utilitarians, he said, justified responsibility and punishment on the ground of their usefulness in preventing like errors in an individual who needed but the penal motivation to be able to follow the moral rule; but intuitionist moralists regarded freedom as indispensable to good and ill desert.² This division of opinions touches on the enactment of values. Of the essence of the values themselves, Sidgwick held that if happiness should be accepted as the generic good by the libertarian, the determinist would have no reason to reject it; and that if excellence should be the good, it would remain so if our attainment of it were set by causes, unless the excellence should be defined as containing freedom of will; but excellence of body or of mind, or of courage, justice and temperance, was not impaired by its being determined.³

Hartmann's discussion of value is relevant at this point, by making a cleavage between types of value such that the excellence of courage or of justice might be independent of the question of their caused status, while the excellence of the individual having those virtues would not be independent. Hartmann distinguished between goods-values and moral values.⁴ In a just transaction a citizen may yield a piece of property to another. The property has a goods-value to the recipient, and the disposition of the first citizen to be just and peaceable yields to the second citizen further goods-values of security and peace, which he enjoys without coming within the sphere of moral judgment. But the first citizen, by freely intending that the second shall have the goods-values named, has in return not goods-values (although these may come to him in the form of reciprocity by the neighbor), but the moral value associated with his intention and action.⁵ He intends a goods-value for another person, and himself has moral value, which is based on the intending and thus on the goods-value, but accrues to him in a measure independent of the measure of the goods-value. In Hartmann's terms, the goods values were Dingwerte

¹Henry Sidgwick, History of Ethics (London: Macmillan & Co., 1902), pp. 262-65.

²Ibid.

³Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 68.

⁴Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1926), p. 228.

⁵Ibid., pp. 233-38.

or Sachverhaltenswerte, while the moral values were Aktwerte or Gesinnungswerte. Whether the agent was free or not, the goods-value accruing to the patient remained the same; and the ontological nature of a person's virtues, his kindness or courage, did not depend on the person's freedom. A person not free could be just and truthful, as well as securing to others the benefits of those habits; but only if he were free could he be said to have moral value in the exercise of those habits.¹ Thus the definition of moral value in Hartmann, while implying a reference to goods-values and to action, included also reference to freedom. Of two acts, intentions or states of character, both might have value, but only the set having freedom would have moral value. Justice was a virtue, or a habit of moral character, only if the person "in principle had the possibility of being unjust."²

Hartmann's distinction between moral and goods values is an application of the common distinction between "subjective" and "objective" right. According to this distinction, an act having good consequences may have sprung from bad motives, which in turn indicated a bad disposition, or tendency to act upon bad motives; in respect of the good consequences the action was "objectively" right, while in respect of the bad motives and disposition it was "subjectively" wrong. Now virtue, as a quality, state, habit or disposition governing particular duties or right acts, is predicated in respect of the subjective rightness. It may be considered in that regard, without the irruption into the situation of the idea of freedom. Then if an act may be caused and yet be subjectively right, it may be caused and exhibit virtue. Various views have been advanced about the criteria of the subjective rightness. Kant's view of the autonomy of the reason made the rightness to consist in the determination of will by the pure form of law, irrespective of material good; since this formal determination was for him freedom, the subjective rightness implied freedom.³ But if, on the contrary, the rightness consists in love of others, a person so moved will act virtuously, even though his love may not be a function of his freedom, but a phase of his character set by the previous history of his empirical self. The

¹Ibid., p. 569.

²Ibid.

³Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1898), pp. 114 ff.

definition of virtue in terms of states of character leading to good acts (Aristotle), or of good habits (Aquinas), or of power (Spinoza), or of "habitual disposition to perform certain actions, which generally produce the best possible results" (Moore),¹ does not in itself specify the origin of the states or dispositions, or the possibility the individual may have of waiving the disposition to engage in vice.

The conception of virtue has a morally neutral base in psychology, and two possible bearings in ethics which divide on the question of freedom in the manner suggested above. The psychological import of virtue lies in the assertion of abiding qualities or states of character, from which we can infer to types of acts more surely than we can infer from a given act. The objective rightness of a certain action is no promise of the objective rightness of future actions, but the subjective rightness of it is such a promise, provided the person acts with knowledge of particular circumstances, and the criteria of subjective rightness for him imply some view of the objective rightness. The more steadfast the disposition, the less fallible will be the prediction from it to good acts, and the greater the play of causality in the sense of uniformity or of predictability. Virtue then, in its psychological basis, implies a trait of uniformity of action, of the uniform production of good by the virtuous individual, which is the basis of our reliance upon people whom we call virtuous. In this regard, our only use for the conception of virtue is to emphasize those traits in an individual which agree with causality defined in terms of law. This is true also of the first of the two ethical bearings of virtue. Virtue is not only a lasting quality, but a good quality which secures good acts. As a means to them, its merit depends on the steadiness of its contribution to them. In this respect an automaton of virtue is desirable. As an automaton, the virtuous individual could be counted upon to do the good at all times. All of his outer operations would be governed by the moral law, or by the teleology of value, and his intentions and dispositions could be informed with that love which may well be recommended as the sufficient condition of inner rightness and merit. No complaint could be made of this situation, unless we should care to consider the other ethical factor, which

¹G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1903), sec. 103.

supposes something besides the external goods we may deliver to others and the attitudes governing our actions. This other factor supposes a good in freedom as such, in the capacity to do the wrong while choosing the right. Its extreme form comes in the assertion that it is better freely to do wrong, than to do right in the manner of an automaton.

The criticism of this position is difficult. An appeal may always be made to an intrinsic value of arbitrarist freedom, which may be intuited and thus admitted but may not be known mediately. Among the intuitions of good accepted by some moralists who reject teleological ethics, this intuition might take its place. Again, distinctions might be made in respect of the type of freedom involved. We might see how a person acting involuntarily for a good end might rather act voluntarily for a bad end, provided the value of the external actions in either case was not of the order of magnitude of the value of the expression of the individual's personality in the voluntary act. Also we might see the difference between a good act done unhesitatingly out of innocence of evil, and a good act done with difficulty because of knowledge of evil; in this case we are aware that the innocent one might well stumble when exposed to the experience of the other, and that that experience itself may be associated with goods denied to the pure, which furnish the personality with depth and comprehension. But here we suppose the devotee of completeness instead of purity (Hartmann's antithesis of Fülle and Reinheit)¹ not to act out of conformity with his character, and not to require the freedom of indifference; and we make no supposition about his voluntary enactment of character. We praise the wisdom of this person without regard to its origin, and regard his acts as maturely done when they are determined by his empirical personality and sustain a harmonious relation to the other acts and values of the person. This is as far as we are interested in going in the direction of freedom. The virtue of such a person is not that of a child, but of an individual who knows that the relation of good to evil is not simple. Since we are interested in the person himself and not merely in muscular concomitants of his activity, we require freedom in the sense of the voluntary, without which the person's values do not come to grips with the

¹Hartmann, pp. 365-76.

outer world, which is the proving ground of virtues respecting social intercourse. We also require freedom in the sense of the determination of actions and choices by the enduring motives of the person. Beyond this we do not need to go in the quest of virtue.

Moral obligation presents another problem. In respect of a particular virtue a person may fulfill a particular moral law, while lacking another virtue also prescribed. It is then asked how mandatory is the prescription, and what is the condition of a reciprocal ability on the part of the person to accept it. Of the first it is evident that obligation may be limited to moral values, whence other values might exist without placing the agent under an obligation to fulfill them. The definition of value may also be made in terms of desire, pleasure or interest; here the value depends on the attitude of the agent, whose evaluation is based on a psychological process tending toward the object of value without needing the added incentive of oughtness. If the good is what is desired, it is superfluous to tell a person desiring it that he ought to desire it; and if he does not desire it, bearing in mind the claims of prudence regarding the relation of the present to other desires, there is no good for him, and therefore no obligation. To this the answer of defendants of moral obligation is that moral value cannot be reduced to terms drawn from psychology, or from any other discipline describing what is. We may be disposed to deny this, but we must still admit the existence of the phenomena asserted by moralists in describing the sense of obligation; the existence is a matter of common experience. But it may be explained from a "naturalistic" basis, on the ground that the oughtness, when conflicting with our present interest or desire, is a mode of calling our attention to the other members of our system of values, which may lie in the future of our own experience or in the present experience of others, but may not have a voice in present consciousness equal to the voice they will have in a future awareness or in the experience of others. Admittedly then we do feel an obligation concerning values of others, and may admit the obligation despite the tendency of our own consciousness to have no traffic with it, on the ground that the value and its obligation abide independent of our present assent. But from this viewpoint the oughtness is a character of the value which appears to constitute the value as such, or at least to be a char-

acter qualifying value generically when conceived in respect of existence. To say that we ought to do a given act, means merely that the act has value. All values prescribe their own enactment. The prescription, as part of the value, does not of itself involve the capacity of the individual to enact the value. A good is a good, whether anyone can realize it or not. If, then, we premise the being of values independent of our present assent to them, we must admit the being of obligation independent of our present acceptance of the obligation.

Since the present acceptance is a condition of the deliberate enactment of the value, and depends in turn on our present character, it does not appear that we are free either to accept or reject if our present character is determined in the direction of one of these. The individual acting according to his character cannot will the good or the bad equally well, for his character does not accept both of these equally well. It then appears that the mandatory nature of obligation does not imply a reciprocal ability on the part of the individual to enact the value. Some values he can enact; to others he may be blind, although obligated if the definition of value goes beyond present interest. There is nothing surprising about this from the standpoint of value, or from the standpoint of oughtness as a modality qualifying value or as an essence constituting value. Difficulty arises only when obligation introduces the element of violent motivation described by Paley, in the sense that if the oughtness is disregarded, the individual will be punished. But there are two senses in which obligation might be taken without excluding punishment, of which one answers to our present conception in terms of oughtness and the other introduces the difficulty. If the value is disregarded, the individual loses the value by his omitting to realize it. All punishment is constituted by loss of good or infliction of evil. The loss of the good in the case of the delinquent person is a punishment intrinsic to his action and does not come from without. But extrinsic penalties may be added, from the state or from God. In this case there may be difficulty in reconciling the punishment with the inability of the individual to choose otherwise. A retributive penalty would appear to have no justification, as the sequel will show; but a corrective penalty could add to the individual's view of the value and perhaps induce him to enact it. Either type of punishment is usually conceived as

implying the infliction of pain on the misdoer; and conversely, good desert is conceived in terms of a pleasant reward. These are the sanctions used by the state, and thought to be resident in the post-mortem abodes of most religions. But it appears that such sanctions cannot be part of the obligation associated with moral value, if it is true that moral values are independent of pleasure and pain. If our moral status consists in realizing the moral good for its own sake, there is no justification in the nature of that good, or in the desire to improve our moral status, to try to implement either of these with non-moral pleasures and pains. A person acting out of fear of pain, or love of pleasure, does not do right for its own sake, and does not add to his moral stature. If the instruments of hedonism are applied to move individuals, they can at best secure the external goods enjoined by moral laws, without securing that moral culture of the psyche, or love of rightness, which is enjoined by the moral law directly. In view of this it is doubtful that the moral values themselves imply an obligation involving threat of pain. The only loss they inflict on the delinquent person is the loss of the non-hedonic values of morality, which he may very well not miss. It is society which adds the extrinsic penalties; in so doing it tacitly admits that for social purposes, the strongest values are those defended by hedonism. It may then be concluded that moral obligation does not itself imply the extrinsic motivation, or punishment, which in its retributive form implies a capacity to have done differently given the same conditions. The freedom of indifference is not its prerequisite. What would be calamitous to moral value is a determinism of the order of a "teleology of evil" (Hartmann).¹ Such a teleology is not implied by determination as such, but must have further cause. In human character as we know it, volitions may be formed by character, and character by social and biological factors, without implying the hostility of character to moral value. And it is only from such determination that we can infer from a person's enduring motives to his actions, and consider that himself, as distinguished from particular acts of his, is a moral agent.

This discussion has brought us to a further problem, of the conditions for and the purposes of responsibility. It appears

¹Ibid., p. 345.

that in responsibility, someone is considered to answer to someone or something because of something he has done; and the answering has consequences related to punishment or reward. We have already suggested that the consequences of answering to a moral law are not the same as those implied in answering to the state or society because of the difference in the values concerned in the punishment. Passing on to the other items in our formulation, we may ask: what is the relation between the person held responsible and the action for which he is responsible, and what is the purpose of the punishment or reward which follows upon his accountability.

It has frequently been supposed that the responsibility of a wrong-doer for his deed implied that he could have chosen the right deed in the conditions which governed his wrong choice. This is to base responsibility on indeterminism. It is held that if the act were caused by a series transcending the individual, the series and not the individual would be responsible for the act, and he should be neither blamed or praised. In contrast to this position, advocates of causality declare that indeterminism would remove any connection between the person and his act, whence he could not be responsible for it. In view of this difficulty, Macintosh pointed to the dilemma of determinism or indeterminism: if the act were caused, it would ultimately be due to factors not controlled by the individual; if the act were uncaused, it would be due to nothing, including the individual.¹ In either case there would be no room for praise or blame. To escape the difficulty, Macintosh resorted to a view of causation as contemporaneous. Not the self preceding the act, but the self simultaneous with the act, would determine the act. The simultaneous self was not pre-determined completely; it could be forecast within limits from the previous self, but room was left for new characters not derivable from the past.² To implement the desired determination, Macintosh defended the view that causality may be contemporaneous with its effectiveness. We need not trouble with this point; the defense can be bolstered with citations from Kant and Peirce, agreeing that causes may or do co-exist with their effects instead of being necessarily pre-existent. The difficulty with Macintosh's

¹D. C. Macintosh, "Responsibility, Freedom and Causality," Journal of Philosophy, XXXVII, p. 44.

²Ibid., p. 47.

view is that it does not escape the dilemma. To suppose that the "strictly contemporaneous character and thought"¹ of which he speaks determines the action, and therefore can be held responsible, and then to suppose that this contemporary character has an element of indetermination in regard to the preceding character, is to insert a contingency which is surely as damaging as that which he wished to avoid, between a previous character and a consequent act. It is not the time-relation which we consider in assessing responsibility, but the determination of one item by another, irrespective of their time-relation. If we can pursue a series of determinants backward to a source, we hold the source responsible regardless of its temporal relation to the last effect; and if a gap appears somewhere in the series, as Macintosh asserts, the assessment of blame stops at the gap. Furthermore it appears that if responsibility depends on the change of character from moment to moment, there is no point in inflicting pain after the act; for the self which is made to suffer is not quite the self which did the deed, and may indeed be a self which, for no assignable reason, has already repented of the deed. If it is answered that the self in its basic traits persists, it is still clear that it is not to the determined persistence that appeal is made for responsibility, but to the innovations not determined. It would be paradoxical to make the innovations the justification for responsibility, then to make the persistence the scapegoat.

It seems that indeterminism, to whatever degree it may be entertained, implies a like degree of improbability of laying the action to the person, since in that degree he did not cause it. Furthermore, the purpose of punishment would seem to disappear on this ground; for if the pain is designed to avoid future evil choices and to discourage others from the evil, it is obvious that the design will succeed only if the pain will motivate the persons concerned in a better direction. The motivating power of the pain is manifestly causal. Given the pain, we predict a difference in the choice. Denying any causality of the painful motive on the will, there could be no inference from the pain to the choice. It appears then that indeterminism, or the freedom of indifference or of completely arbitrary equilibrium, assigns no relevant relation between the person and his acts, and affords no reason for cor-

¹Ibid., p. 46.

rective penalty. Recourse may be had to penalty in the spirit of retribution or of revenge; it seems unnecessary to attempt a refutation of such method, although its historical import has been great enough.

These objections to undetermined activity apply to the relation of self to its choice. They do not hold for an uncaused factor in the activity of the self, provided such a factor does not monopolize the activity. The self may be held responsible for its acts if it causes them, without directly precipitating the question of whether the self was caused. But if the self were entirely uncaused in making its present choice, but determined it of itself, the efficacy of motives on the self would disappear, unless the motives, however passing, be included in the self. The motives in question are motives in prospect, set by the state or the system of values held by the individual. They are to have an influence, or causal tendency, on the person. As motives in prospect they are not properly in the self; that place is reserved for motives in esse, or desires which view the motives in prospect and favor them. Accordingly some of the causal fabric operates on the self but is not part of the self, even though the self be taken in a wide and loose sense, as including all of its desires. This causality is sufficient for the efficacy of the corrective punishment envisioned by the state or other authorities. For the rest, the self may be credited with a measure of spontaneity, or disjunction from other causes; and again, it may be held to be derived from other causes, taken from social, biological or physical levels. Now the further assessment of responsibility may be indifferent to the causation of the self, on the ground that the future good effects of responsibility may be consistent with the determination of self by factors outside it. This view will be treated shortly. But it may also be held that a person is not properly responsible for his acts if he is not the ultimate cause of them. Macintosh's theory is an attempt to break off the chain of accountings at a point within the self. Perhaps our final criticism of it is that it breaks off the chain at a point too close to the act which precipitated the question of accounting, in that it supposes a gap between the present and immediately preceding selves. It might be better to associate the past self with the present in the accounting, instead of basing the accounting on a schism, however small, between past and present selves.

This alternative method has been developed by Wisdom.

Wisdom held that blame implied ultimate responsibility by the self for its acts.

What blame requires is that, however far back we go in setting out the causes of your act, we shall never come to a time at which a set of purely external circumstances, i.e. not involving you and your will, formed a complete cause of your act. Therefore, if you are to blame for an act A, then either (a) at some time the series of causes of your decision to do A becomes incomplete or ceases altogether, or (b) the series is an infinite series of determinations of your will by your will.¹

Alternatives (a) and (b) were to agree with the law of causation. For alternative (a), the law was stated mildly to require causation of every event except the first events; then a 'world-long' series of determinations of a person's decisions by prior decisions of the person was supposed possible, with no influence from a source prior to the first activity of the self.² For alternative (b) the law of causation was entertained in what Wisdom called a strict form, according to which every event was completely determined, and entered into an infinite series of causes and effects; and again the series was to be made up of decisions of the person involved.³ Either series would regress beyond the birth of the individual. If the first mental event at birth was a decision, there were three implications held by Wisdom: first, that the cause of the event must be mental, due to the impossibility of explaining mental events by material events; second, that the event causing must be a decision or desire, which could be explained only through other desires; and third, that the event causing must be in the mind of the event caused.⁴ The first two propositions Wisdom based not on ethics but on psychology and the relation he supposed to hold between body and mind. The third he evidently ascribed, in part at least, to the demands of responsibility; for blame implied the ultimate causation by the person blamed, and not by some other consciousness.⁵

Wisdom's view of responsibility implies a disposition of the mind-body problem, which we have refused to make for reasons

¹John Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1934), p. 118.

²Ibid., p. 122.

³Ibid., p. 123.

⁴Ibid., pp. 124-26.

⁵Ibid., p. 126.

suggested in the discussion of the derivation of psychological facts from physical facts. It may be that the self whose history we sketched above, while passive in part, has a pre-natal history extending backward infinitely distant or to a first cause which is also the self. We have insufficient evidence for the infinite history, of which we have no experience, and the implementation of it by ethics may not be required if other views of responsibility are acceptable, which in turn have more modest speculative consequences. The first cause must be eternal, and its relation to succeeding events would raise the queries advanced above. The direct action of one mind on another, which Wisdom questioned, might be in the power of God; whence the ultimate cause of our decisions, even if they antedate birth, might be God or some other consciousness. If the series belongs to ourself alone, as Wisdom holds, it still does not have any evident affinity with our present consciousness, which is held responsible. It seems strange to blame a person for a choice made in this year because of causes occurring at the beginning of time, over which he has no present control; just as it would seem strange to try to go back to the first causes and hold them responsible for the present event, of which they could have no knowledge and over which they could have no awareness of control, unless invested with divine omniscience and power. The search for ultimate responsibility should imply consequences in keeping with the ultimate character; it should imply blame laid to the distant causes and remorse felt by them. We have no evidence of such phenomena, and Wisdom does not consider them. Where Macintosh appears to have cut off the recent self from the contemporary self in order to save responsibility, Wisdom appears to have made a meaningless extension of the self, for the same reason. Finally, it does not appear that blame, described by Wisdom as meaning also that we could have acted differently,¹ is justified by his account of ultimate responsibility. The freedom of the self from other causes does not mean its ability to do the right. That freedom removes obstacles external to the self, which might force it from a right choice; it does not supply any positive factor from which we could speak of a real possibility of making the given choice.

It seems better to approach responsibility from a stand-

¹Ibid., p. 114.

point less metaphysical and ultimate. This approach is indifferent to the causation of the self, provided the self can be influenced by responsibility and is known to be the cause of its choices, according to qualifications soon to appear. A number of writers divorce responsibility from ultimate causation or from capacity to have chosen otherwise in the conditions given for choice. Schlick considered the role of penalties to be that of motives which should hinder the bad choice and when successful stop it; such motivation was causal, and was to be applied not to the ultimate causes of the act, but to the locus which might be presently affected by the motivation; this locus was the acting individual himself.¹ Although the assessment of responsibility in terms of causation suggests at first that the only point to which penalty should be applied is the point at which the first mover of the action lies, which may make the application impossible because of the distance in time, or diffuseness in space, of that mover or movers: Schlick's method indicates a satisfactory way of making a more likely application, directed to the present causes which seem able to influence choice without treating of earlier causes. But the successfulness of holding the acting individual responsible, and not his parents or his society, is not complete, as one might infer from the existence of other causes. A person not disposed to view the happiness of others as being a good for himself, may be induced to safeguard that happiness because of the penalty the state would inflict if he did not; but it is not his enduring motives which are affected by the penalty, but the relation to them of momentary motives. In one situation his enduring love of his own pleasure alone may be satisfied by the destruction of others' pleasure; in the other, given the threat of punishment, the same enduring motives will require the preservation of the others' pleasures. If we could go backward in time and change the environment in which the criminal grew up, we might be able to change the enduring motives also. This we cannot do; we must content ourselves for the present with momentary expedients, although a program running for some time in the future may remake the enduring motives into a more sociable mold.

A number of other writers have agreed in the founding of responsibility on causality. Goedeckemeyer considered that

¹Moritz Schlick, Fragen der Ethik (Vienna: Julius Springer, 1930), p. 112.

responsibility must imply a cause of volition and the influence of the penal consequences on volition; both of these would disappear with indeterminism.¹ McGilvary agreed that determinism could not accept a responsibility dependent on the power of the actor to have done differently in the same conditions;² but the reasonableness of punishment, he held, was not based on the past, but on the future, which could be influenced by making the actor responsible: the rationale of responsibility was not in the "undeterminedness of their wills, but in the fact that experience has shown that their wills can be determined by holding them responsible."³ Windelband took much the same view. He found several types of responsibility, ranging from that implied in revenge to that implied in the self-responsibility of an individual whose conscience accused him of evil, and including the legal responsibility of a citizen to the law.⁴ All of these types presupposed that the act was chosen, and that the choice came from the individual as a whole instead of from motives not representative of the individual.⁵ These two causalities being ascertained, punishment followed, without asking whether the individual's enduring characters could have been different. Windelband thus did not question the fact that responsibility was practised within the limits of determinism, but he raised the question of the rightness of that practice, in case the rightness should depend on the power of the individual to have made a different self or system of values. We have already seen how the pursuit of the justification took Windelband through the metaphysical quest of an uncaused volition or volitional essence, called intelligible freedom. We saw that the freedom he asserted, on a level anterior to those of Handlungsfreiheit and Wahlfreiheit, was based not on the negation of the causation of volition, but on our right to abstract from such causation in the interest of norms. The norms concerned the

¹Albert Goedeckemeyer, Das Freiheitsproblem (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1931), p. 27.

²E. B. McGilvary, "Freedom and Necessity in Human Affairs," International Journal of Ethics, July, 1935, p. 392.

³Ibid., p. 396.

⁴Wilhelm Windelband, Über Willensfreiheit (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1905), pp. 204-08.

⁵Ibid., p. 209.

⁶Ibid., p. 211.

responsibility of the individual. The norms demanded their own enactment, and justified the imposition of penalties not because the concrete individual person could have done differently than he did, but because he might act more favorably toward the norms if penal motivation was added to the agent's view of them. Thus the justification of punishment not on the basis of the past, which was caused, but on the basis of the expected future, which could be improved through responsibility.¹ Windelband's theory then asserts a deterministic responsibility with a corrective penology. As a reminiscence of the retributively inspired responsibility of undetermined volition, he added that it was not the individual in question who could have been different and thus could have chosen differently, but mankind in general: "In place of the assertion that the man could have been different, appears the assertion that he ought to have been different. . . . The subject of the conditional sentence is then not the concrete individual, but the ethical, normative concept of mankind in general."² Since it is the individual who is held responsible, and is punished, it is clear that this allusion to mankind in general cannot justify Windelband's defense of deterministic responsibility, which is complete when made in terms of future motivation and correction. It may serve to restrict the norms in question to those which men as men may be able to envision, or it may justify a leniency toward volitions which seem to spring from our common human heritage, if there are such. But this allusion to indeterminism is not as superfluous as the implementation made by Windelband of his intelligible freedom, rehearsed above in Chapter II. There we called attention to the fact that this freedom did not negate causality; and here it seems evident that the consequences to be got from it, in the way of justifying responsibility, can be gotten directly from the theory of causally motivating punishment, advanced by several authors discussed in this section without resort to metaphysics or to a correction of Kant.

A further question concerning responsibility may arise in the examination of the nature of the causality asserted to hold between the person held responsible and the choice for which he is held responsible. On such a view as Russell's, which considers causal law solely in terms of predictability and ascribes no

¹Ibid., p. 218.

²Ibid., p. 217.

importance to the distinction of one term from the other in regard to the one being a cause and the other an effect, it appears that there is no reason for holding the person responsible instead of his choice. The movement from person to choice would be no more reasonable than the reverse movement, which is not made in the interest of correction, for the choice in the first place does not exist at the time of accounting, and we suppose no causal operation on the person if we could deal with it. Responsibility implies a closer, tighter relation between person and choice, than that allowed by a "positivistic" view of causality. The relation between person and choice is, for practical purposes, one of production of effect by cause. We suppose the person to be the ground not only of our knowledge of the choice, but of the being of the choice. But it is not necessary to suppose a metaphysic of power, or of originative causality. We are satisfied to find that one event or entity, here the person, can be subjected to other events, or penal motives, which elicit the desired effects. It is the existence of these events or entities which concerns us, and not the manner of their genesis or connection.

In opposition to the deterministic reduction of responsibility, Hartmann has stated a view of freedom, in terms of responsibility, which turns especially on the self-inflicted consequences of responsibility, including remorse and sense of guilt. Hartmann had denied that the consciousness of freedom or self-determination was evidence for the reality of self-determination, on the ground that "out of the consciousness of the reality of a thing the reality of the thing never follows necessarily";¹ and that the reality behind the consciousness of self-determination might be other than that presented in consciousness. But the phenomena of responsibility were evidence for self-determination of the order noted at the conclusion of Chapter II.² These phenomena included not only the consciousness of feeling responsible, but also the acceptance of that consciousness, as documented in real, unimpeachable acts of moral life: "The phenomena consist not only in a subjective conviction in the person, but also in a real ethical conduct, with which the person as it were assumed the consequences of its conviction."³ The person holding himself responsible (and for

¹Hartmann, p. 637.

²Ibid., p. 661.

³Ibid., pp. 659-60.

Hartmann no responsibility was unquestionable unless the agent concurred in its assertion) took upon himself the consequences of his action, and when the choice was bad he accepted a burden of guilt and pain which he would have no biologically useful reason for accepting. In view of this pain, which Hartmann asserted ran counter to every natural interest of the person, a certain objectivity could be ascribed to the judgment of self-determination, for it could not be held to be influenced by the natural interests of the agent.¹ Since the "natural" desires of the individual could have no satisfaction in the guilt, the satisfaction must be sought in a moral essence in the person, which was based on the uncaused freedom of the person, and accepted the guilt rather than surrender the freedom which implied the susceptibility to guilt in cases of evil choice.² To surrender the guilt were to surrender the freedom of this essence. Hartmann further asserted that if the acceptance of the responsibility and the guilt by the person were to be explained on evolutionary or social grounds, in the sense that the person's acceptance implied a deception having a biological or social value in making him more amenable to discipline and castigation, the mechanism of the deception would have a categorial form so much higher than that of ordinary biological or social processes, that the mechanism would itself illustrate freedom.³ The mechanism would have a novum above the categorial traits of lower levels of existence. Hartmann did not expand this thesis, but it appears that the lower levels would include the Kausalnexus and Finalnexus, above which the deceptive mechanism would have a new Gesetzlichkeit, or law of operation, which would have a measure of freedom in relation to the lower levels, analogous to the measure of freedom sustained by final causality in the face of physical causes. The new level would be the same as that desired by Hartmann in the Person, or third determinant; thus the attempt to refute the higher determination and its freedom would end in the circuitous proof of it.⁴

The criticism of Hartmann's view of responsibility and guilt involves perhaps three points. It seems first of all that the superior weight he gave to the phenomenon of responsibility as against the phenomenon of the consciousness of self-determination

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., 624-26.

³Ibid., p. 668.

⁴Ibid., p. 669.

might be unjustified. The phenomena of responsibility have their source in the consciousness of being responsible, and need no other cause. The person might be mistaken in thinking himself responsible, and yet proceed with the real, ethical facts of sense of guilt and of remorse; for these depend on the vividness of belief and not on its truth. At best they would attest to the conviction of guilt, and not to the truth of the belief in one's responsibility. The sense of guilt itself is a phenomenon of consciousness, whose reality as an item of awareness need not be denied; but we may still ask whether the sense of guilt is based on real guilt, which, agreeing with Hartmann for the sake of his argument, we would condition on a capacity to have chosen otherwise than the agent chose. If we may question the transit from consciousness of self-determination to the actual being of self-determination, we may also question the transit from the consciousness of guilt to the being of guilt.

Second, it appears that the pain of remorse and of consciousness of guilt may not be as contrary to the usual desires of the person as Hartmann supposed, wherefore the ethical objectivity he claimed might be impaired. A psychology of masochism may readily show that the consciousness of the agent may favor painful elements, whether in the form of discrete physical pains localized in parts of the body, or in the form of more subjective affections appearing to qualify awareness more generally, as in the case of guilt. Although the satisfying of desire may involve pleasant elements of awareness, the objects involved in the satisfaction may not be pleasures, but pains; and the paradox of a pleasurable or desiring movement toward pain disappears if distinction is made between levels or loci of awareness, such that a central phase of awareness may take pleasure in a peripheral phase of pain. Freud has called attention to the aggressive elements in our natures, which turn inward when blocked and cause pain to the person with the appearance of his consent.¹ Nietzsche's ethics is perhaps primarily an ethics of pain. It posits a natural desire to cause pain to others, and a certain healthiness among robust persons which makes them regard pain as a lesser evil than others might suppose. Nietzsche anticipated the Freudian view of conscience in his analysis of asceticism and freedom. In regard to the first,

¹Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1930), p. 114.

a person or people brought to a state of lassitude, nihilism or disillusionment by the seeming worthlessness of values, might turn in defense to several means of restoring the life-pulse, of which the worst was the cultivation of violent feelings of anger, fear, revenge, triumph, desperation and cruelty; these were abetted by the conception of guilt, which allowed the person to afflict himself with an orgy of passions on the ground that they were his due penalty for wrong.¹ In regard to the second, a people conquered by a stronger race might internalize their freedom, suppose themselves the free cause of their wrong-doing as well as of their good, and bring themselves before this inner court and administer judgment denied them in the outer world.²

In defense of views such as these it must be considered that, to a person designing hurt to himself, nothing could so well relieve the appearance to himself of masochism, as to feel that the pain was not of his own doing, but was inflicted by a moral authority transcending himself; and perhaps nothing could give the pain such undisputed mastery of his awareness, as the full yielding to it on the ground that he deserved it. From the point of view of masochism, the last exquisite touch of pain must consist in the complete avowal of it and yielding to it. But the reason for the yielding, the sense of demerit, must precede the yielding if it is to cause it. The person must cognize the oughtness which makes his remorse morally enjoined, before he can give way to this pain in its entirety. The mere fact of the internalization of aggression does not imply an awareness by the person that he ought to internalize it, or that he ought to suffer pain. Yet such awareness is part of conscience, when it is confronted by evil choice. Then it would appear that this theory does not explain the origin of conscience, or of the sense of guilt, although it would show how a person who feels the power of moral ideas might get the energy for penance. The sense of guilt involves a perception of the morally enjoined character of the pain, which must come from other sources, however much it may add to the fuel of the masochistic sources once it has arrived.

A more likely view of the role of remorse and feeling of

¹Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke, Vol. 7, Zur Genealogie der Moral (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1899), Essay III, sec. 20.

²Ibid., Essay II, sec. 17.

guilt in moral consciousness could find a more intelligible relation of these to moral values, without asserting the capacity of the self to have chosen differently in the same circumstances. The third point of criticism of Hartmann's view is that he made no demonstration that the categorial form of the deception, if it were a deception, was higher than that of the other levels of determination. If society or nature should deceive people into thinking themselves the uncaused cause of choice, in order to make them more amenable to penance and reform, it would appear first that the mere seeming of uncaused causality would suffice for the amenability, whence we need infer from the latter to nothing stronger than the appearance; and second, that the mechanism would have definite final ends, of social discipline, which would not transcend the Finalnexus. It seems sufficient to stay on that level, and to consider the sense of remorse as being directed primarily to our moral being, and not to its supposed basis in indeterminism. Remorse involves first of all a sense of dereliction before the moral law. It is retrospective, in being concerned with a prior act which we now regret. Armed with that regret, we feel that our present self would not act as we did in the past instance. Then we suppose that the past self need not have acted badly either. We forget that the past self did not have that lively apprehension of the good, which now shows itself in our regret. So the past self was not quite like our present self. The present self, as a matter of fact, cannot choose the evil in the presence of its regret, and so it is as uniquely determining as was the past self whose arbitrary choice it seems to affirm. The projection backwards of the present self is in some degree justified, for the person who has for some time loved the good feels differently about dereliction than one who has newly come to love it. The convert feels remorse about his past acts, in the sense that he had frustrated the moral law he now venerates. But the person who has had some abiding love for that law, feels that he has frustrated not only the law, but himself. At the time of his evil choice he regarded that law as highly as he now does. In consequence he feels he could have pursued it as faithfully then as now, on the ground that the sufficient condition of the pursuit is the regard. But the regard documents itself with varying clarity and emphasis, which were at low ebb at the time of sinning, but come to high tide in the hour of remorse. Then the person may well feel

sorrow, in the face of the law and in the view of his ideal self. But we do not see that this sorrow requires the freedom of alternatives, unless we abstract from the detail which regards the latency or explicitness of the regard, and consider only the susceptibility of the person to the ideal. But in so abstracting we omit some of the causal factors which explain the difference in choice, and get the identity of conditions by a falsifying simplification.

If our analysis is correct, the freedom required by the phenomena of remorse, punishment and responsibility is not that based on non-causality, but on the causation of choice by the enduring motives or values of the empirical self. It is that self which is punished and does penance. For acts done in sudden passion we do not in the same sense hold ourselves responsible, or liable to remorse, for they are not the result of our constant motives. In their case we may feel remorse if we think we might have better controlled our passion; then our remorse is directed primarily to our lack of control, although our regret may be extended without an immediate sense of guilt to the bad consequences of the lack of control. But in cases where special factors intervene, such as hypnotism or drugging with no possible prevision of consequences, our regret is directed solely to the harm done others, and has no sense of guilt, for we do not feel that our own self was the cause, or that it was derelict. For the same reason we do not punish. The abnormal state of the person under these influences does not allow him to be subject to motives which he usually feels, such as those of moral obligation or of penal sanction; and the normal state of the person is not there to be influenced, nor would it need drastic influence if, as we may premise, its normal view were favorable to the spread of good.

The conception of rationality enters at this point, since it defines the relation of the self to its free choices. The view of will as rational appetite, as the causality of reason or as deliberate desire indicates the function of reason in volition, and especially in free volition. We shall not consider reason as an independent entity discriminable from the experienced values or motives of the individual, which causally influences the acceptance or rejection of them, but as a form of agreement sustained by the values in relation to each other. In this capacity reason does not exist separate from desires or passions, and is subservient to

them. It defines the maximum compossibility of desires, of which each may be credited with value taken alone, but may lose it in conflict with a desire or system of desires more strongly or highly held. The love of reason is the love of the unity of our desires, and the agency of reason in choice is the agency of our concern that the motive victorious in choice should fit into that unity. The function of deliberation is to compare the motives consciously present with those not present in awareness by arousing to present efficacy motives which we know to have been significant throughout the past, and to reject from present awareness such motives as may clash with those held more important. A choice is rational in proportion as a greater number of abiding motives have a voice in determining the choice, for the abiding motives make up the basic traits of the unity, or system of compossibles, into which reason would have us put the present choice. In this sense rationality is a relational term defining freedom which does not specify the character of the terms related. If the choice agrees with the unity, it is rational and free, regardless of the character of the abiding motives involved in the unity. The motives may themselves be such as another person, or another society or other source of evaluation, may call bad. Then the choice, though rational, would be bad. The congruence of reason and goodness could be demonstrated only if the maximum of compossibility, which would define the greatest rationality, should imply elements held to be good. The demonstration appears unlikely as long as the rationality is limited to the system of each individual ego, as we have limited it, while the good is drawn from society, as we might wish to do.

Accordingly, this freedom of rational choice, which is the condition of inference from the rightness of our acts to the virtue of our self, is not a guarantee of that virtue. Windelband and Sidgwick have carefully distinguished between the ethical and psychological phases of freedom. The determination of choice by self implies moral choice only if the self is a moral self. A person whose habits are directed rather to evil than to good may constitute out of them an enduring character of satanic mold, which may set choice according to the same psychological pattern, and thus with the same freedom of choice, as may be instanced in the choice of a saint. It is clear enough, as Sidgwick pointed out in his criticism of Kantian autonomy of the reason, that if

the free will is the moral will, it cannot commit those acts for which punishment and remorse are the consequents.¹ Such consequents must then fall to the bad will, which is not then free; but being not free, is not susceptible to them. The dilemma can be removed only by distinguishing between the psychological and the moral elements involved in freedom, with the result that the freedom will be conceived in terms necessary to but not sufficient to virtue.

In this section we have been concerned with the relation of value and its human enactment to freedom. We have considered the nature of oughtness, virtue, responsibility, punishment and remorse, and have in each case suggested the fitness of that type of freedom which we first analyzed above in terms of the determination of choice by the enduring motives of the empirical self. Such determination does not waive causality, and it requires for its social effectiveness the freedom of realization of choice, which is the voluntary. It would appear then that our definition of freedom, which was to wait the decision of moral factors, has been sufficiently circumscribed. The determinism which might have seemed hostile to morals appears acceptable to it, and the indeterminism which might have seemed necessary appears useless. In respect of the ethical problem of free-will, the paper might stop here. But further considerations may be advanced, which move the locus of discussion from our enactment of value, to the role the universe may play in distinction from ourselves.

2. The Theological Problem

The theological concern with free-will is directed to the relation of a free will to teleology and divine causality in the cosmos, and to the relation of these two to determinism. It is evident that the theological interest may differ from the ethical according as religious and moral interests may differ. Ethical truth may be held to depend on theological truth, as Occam held, or theological truth may be held to depend on ethical truth, as Kant held. More recently, Hartmann has been concerned to separate the two and even to show their conflict, as documented in a series of antinomies. Ethics dealt with this life, theology with the

¹Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 511-13.

life beyond.¹ Ethics dealt with man, theology with God. Ethics proclaimed the autonomy of moral values, which looked to no further source for their goodness or for power to sustain them in their oughtness; theology asserted that moral values depended on the will or command of God.² Ethics left man free to realize his own value without limitation by a superior teleology; theology asserted such a teleology in the form of divine establishment of the course of good in the world-process, to which man must accede.³ Finally, ethics did not consider the guilt of a free agent to make him incapable of good, and would not surrender the burden of that guilt lest the freedom implied by it should also disappear; but theology felt that the salvation of man implied his redemption from guilt, and for the sake of the redemption was willing to part with the freedom.⁴

Of this set of antinomies, the first two do not directly concern us. The third introduces the conception of power in relation to good, and precipitates the argument about the goodness of an omnipotent being who permits or works evil. The fourth is more general; it concerns the relation of a lesser to a greater teleology, irrespective of the agreement of the two series with regard to good or evil. The fifth may be treated in passing. We may agree with Hartmann's conclusion that theology threatens the type of freedom he espoused, which asserts indeterminism in the assent to value, without agreeing with the details of his treatment of the theological view of guilt. Hartmann held that the moral evil was in wrongness of deed, volition or intention, and not in the blame which would follow upon them; while the evil emphasized by religion was not in these, which could not be removed, but in the blame itself, which could be removed.⁵ We may question whether Hartmann is correct. Neither the moral nor the religious consciousness would assert that the evil is primarily in the past deed or intention, or in the blame inflicted because of it; they would rather assert that the evil is in the imperfection of the abiding self, which, when freely choosing in the sense of freedom chosen in the section preceding, identified itself with the bad intention or deed, and now feels its delinquency and is

¹Hartmann, pp. 737-38.

²Ibid., p. 739.

³Ibid., p. 741.

⁴Ibid., p. 745.

⁵Ibid.

stricken with regret. The salvation of that self, enjoined by the religious consciousness, does not imply the negation of the deed, or of the fact that the person freely espoused it; it rather indicates the separation of the self from the deed, because of the repentance of the self. The separation is documented in the future by the refusal of the self to do the evil again. Both morals and religion would favor such salvation, for it would signify a tendency against the same evil on other occasions, and would remove the imperfection of the present self. Morals are as much concerned as is religion with the perfection of the self. The removal of stain is no threat to the independence of the self, and involves a discipline, authority and activity within the self which hardly attest to its servitude. The case might be different if the guilt were concerned with extrinsic penalties imposed by God. Such penalties might be independent of the remorse felt by the self, and might be waived by a self willing to bargain away its freedom. But it is questionable whether the religious consciousness emphasizes such penalties, and would then be concerned with the bargain.

Of the fourth antinomy, Hartmann held that a final determinism in the cosmos would hamper the freedom of man in working out his own values. The caused status of physical and psychological events did not affect the freedom of man to choose his own values and to enact them, Hartmann held, because these events belonged to a lower level, of the Kausalnexus, which left above itself a level based on the Kausalnexus but free in respect to the final causes defining the new level. The significant difference between the two levels in regard to causality was the open character of the lower and the closed character of the upper level. A number of physical causes were committed, in the absence of final causation, to no definite end, and might allow the entry of further determinants which would not negate the contribution of the causes already there, but merely re-direct the series to a new effect.¹ But if a definite end were prescribed by our values, the indifference of the Kausalnexus to the shift in the end would be confronted by the concern of the Finalnexus, which could accept new determinants only by accepting a new end. The Finalnexus was a closed totality, which new determinants must open in favor of an end which might be in conflict.² Applying this analysis to the

¹Ibid., p. 591.

²Ibid., p. 607.

world at large, Hartmann considered that if the world had a teleology of its own, ours must either conflict, and then give in because of the greater power of the world, or it must agree, in which case it would have no significant contribution to make.¹ The physical determination of the world would not peril our teleology, for it would not deal with ends, and we could manipulate physical causes or add to them in the interests of our ends, without hindering the determination. But the final determination of the world would deal with ends, which we might conflict with in pursuing our ends and the links in the Kausalnexus favoring our ends. In view of the conflict, and the power behind the larger teleology, we could but acquiesce, and become instruments in the larger process.

The special interest of Hartmann's argument is its emphasis on final determination as a menace to our values, instead of determination as such. Our theory of freedom has espoused determinism, but not a cosmically determined teleology, and escapes Hartmann's objections, which are directed to the tendency to define the freedom of man in terms of the cosmic emergence of value. The more usual objection to determinism, when referred to the world at large, makes no distinction between Kausalnexus and Finalnexus, and supposes a conflict between determinism in general and values. James did this in his essay on the "Dilemma of Determinism."

James said that determinism

professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. . . . Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a certain amount of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not necessarily determine what the others shall be.²

The chance involved in indeterminism was of a limited kind:

What are those futures that now seem matters of chance. . . . Are they not all of them kinds of things already here and based in the existing frame of nature . . . ? Do not all the motives that assail us, all the futures that offer themselves to our choice, spring equally from the soil of the past . . . ?³

Neither determinism nor chance could be proved; science dealt with

¹Ibid., pp. 152, 184.

²William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915), p. 150.

³Ibid., p. 157.

facts, but chance asserted the reality of possibilities as well, and facts were inadequate premisses for a conclusion regarding possibilities.¹ Accordingly, the dispute could be left to our choice for its settlement; we would choose the side that seemed more rational to us, more in accord with a good world. "If a certain formula for expressing the nature of the world violates my moral demand, I shall feel as free to throw it overboard, or at least to doubt it, as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence, for example; the one demand being, so far as I can see, quite as subjective and emotional as the other is."² James held that the moral inspection of the conflict of chance and cause favored chance. Given a murder in a determined world, the murder would be the outcome of the world and a sample of it. We would say that the murder ought not to be, while admitting at the same time that it could not but be. "Determinism, in denying that anything else can be in its stead, virtually defines the universe as a place in which what ought to be is impossible, in other words, as an organism whose constitution is afflicted with an incurable taint, an irremediable flaw."³ Then regret for the murder would be regret for the world as a whole, and we would be driven to pessimism.

The alternative to pessimism, according to James, would be subjectivism. We could escape condemnation of the murder and of the world by considering the murder to be good because of its part in a good whole; our judgment of evil would depend on our limited view of things; a complete view would see only good. But then our regret would be erroneous, and we ought to approve instead.⁴ But the regret was determined, whence we would again point to the necessity of something which ought not to exist. Pessimism would re-appear with this difficulty. To escape it, we would have to resort to subjectivism.⁵ James took this term in a limited sense, as designating the cultivation of sensibility and experience. Subjectivism held the good to exist not in the world outside of us, but in our attitude toward it and in our knowledge or feeling of what good and evil were. The regret and remorse attending our view of evil were justified, on this basis, by their

¹Ibid., p. 152.

²Ibid., p. 147.

³Ibid., p. 161.

⁴Ibid., p. 163.

⁵Ibid., pp. 164 ff.

effect in quickening our sense of that which was lost beyond hope of recovery, in bringing home to us the worth of things with a "wilder sweetness."¹ But subjectivism James did not care to accept, because it turned its back on simple objective duties, which gave us comfort in their unquestioned performance, and embraced instead the emotional excesses and perversities typical of decadent romanticism. Rejecting the two alternative consequences of determinism, James accepted instead indeterminism.² Indeterminism did not shut out the possibility of the good in cases where evil had happened. In another work James gave a further argument for indeterminism's value, by holding that if the past of the world were bad, indeterminism would allow the future to have a chance of being different and better, while determinism would confine the future to the traits of the past.³ On the other hand he admitted that freedom would not be wanted in a good world, for we would be content to have a good past duplicated in the future, and have no desire for innovations which might change the world for the worse.⁴

It is difficult to assess an argument as compendious and compressed as the one rehearsed above, and doubtless James could have profited from a more thorough exposition of his thesis. In criticism of it we may suggest that, since the difference asserted between chance and determinism was not very great, in that chance events were held to spring from the soil of the past, the chance world favored by James would appear to bear some of the stamp of the evil deed in question; the murder might not be uniquely associated with the rest of the world, but it would have a fair degree of kinship with it. Again, James did not consider that a good deed would imply a good world, and its reality the impossibility of the wrong act in its place; the world would then, by James' reasoning, be such a place as good would have to happen in. To find out if the world were good or bad on the whole, we should have to measure the ratio of good to bad deeds, and conclude to a similar ratio as defining the disposition of the world. On causal grounds the world would be no better, and no worse, than it is revealed to us in experience, and on indeterministic grounds

¹Ibid., p. 165.

²Ibid., p. 175.

³William James, Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1916), p. 119.

⁴Ibid., p. 120.

we would have no reason to talk about anything but the part experienced; but in either case, as James' radical empiricism would agree, we would have nothing to deal with, in respect of our knowledge, but the experienced; and this locus is determinate, at the time of its existence, to whatever ratio of good and evil we find in it, regardless of the looseness or tightness of its parts. The only good that chance might offer us in competition with determinism would be the comfort of hoping that the future might be better, which we would have to counter-balance with the fear that it might be worse, with ourselves as spectators stripped of the efficacy dependent on our causality. Further, the reasons which might lead us to ascribe goodness to all events, because of the connection they might have with a whole whose good transcends our knowledge, might equally well make the regret and error of our disapproval good; their goodness in the face of the rest of the world might seem contradictory only to our limited view; the catholic gaze which might find murder good, might also find error good. Finally, the sense in which James took the term subjectivism appears to imply goods of another order. He held that the subjective notion of good would consider value in terms of our apprehension of what good and evil were intrinsically, yet he held that this method of viewing good would limit good to our apprehendings. Then the only good our feeling could grasp would be the good of feeling; for our feeling to apprehend evil, would be for the feeling to apprehend itself as evil, which would appear contrary to the subjectivistic notion of good. If all feeling, as feeling, were good, and everything else, as being non-feeling, were neutral, there would be no evil to apprehend. The idea of evil, from the subjectivist standpoint of James, would imply something beyond feeling as such. If it were independent of feeling, it would not conform to James' search for a utility to regret, which is feeling; if it were a qualification of feeling, it might apply to regret as a particular kind of feeling, whence the good of regret would again vanish. But a determinist might point out that an effect is relative to certain causes, which in turn are relative to other causes; ourselves as knowing the goodness of the total world would cease to regret, and then there would be a harmony between the oughtness of the murder and the oughtness of our approval.

The foregoing has shown how both Hartmann and James

considered the consequences of determinism, the one final, the other unqualified, for the relation of human teleology to cosmic teleology. Hartmann supposed the relation would be unfortunate for human teleology regardless of the goodness of the cosmic teleology. James supposed misfortune would enter only if, from bad events experienced, we should have to infer to the necessity of evil in the world, which would be a teleology of evil. The two views come closer, and in sharper opposition, in regard to James' view of the relation of chance in our volitions to providence in the world. In reply to the objection that a universe of chance might be at the mercy of its chance-possibilities, and therefore have no guarantee of an ultimate good outcome, James drew an analogy between a chess game played by an expert and a tyro, and the cosmic process, in which God was the expert and human creatures the tyros.¹ The expert player could not foresee which move the novice would make at a given time, but he could foresee the total of the possibilities open to the novice, and play well enough to divert the actual move into the direction of his own victory. Likewise God could allow human beings alternative choices based on chance, but he would know how to deal with any of the choices in order to keep the world from drifting away from his own intended ends. From his knowledge of all possibilities, plus his power to deal with any combination of them when actualised, God could direct the actual world as securely as if he yielded but one possibility of action in any instance.² The world might zigzag enroute, but God would bring it safely home.

Hartmann could not consent to such a scheme of things, for the teleology of men, however it might range abroad under the aegis of chance, must eventually be brought back to the teleology of God, at which time its independence would pass away. The final ends of man would not be for him to decide. Since James was not interested basically in contingency, but in the realization of good defined in terms omitting freedom, he could sacrifice the freedom of man if it should run contrary to the good designed by God. But in respect of the moral excitement which James described in the battle between equipossible good and evil, we might wonder if he did not rather secure something lukewarm. To a moral agent, a world whose outcome is uncertain, and depends on his own striving

¹James, Will to Believe, pp. 181-82. .

²Ibid.

if it is to end well, is far different from one fore-decreed to end well by a power above him, however much the agent may conspire with or against the decree in the leeway left him by chance. It is a relatively trivial kind of chance which James appears to secure. As a child playing in water knows it will not drown while its parents are near, even though it venture into deeper water than it should, so a person in James' cosmos would know its values and actions are circumscribed by the will of God and have no ultimate danger. In both cases the risks and the strivings would be limited; they would not compare with the deadly seriousness of a world in which the best of volitions might yet end up with a consummate disaster based on total chance. Hartmann did not espouse the chance in the sense that James did, but he drew the more virile consequences.

The compromises James might be said to have drawn in regard to the magnitude of chance and of moral risk appear to have appeared in a further compromise in regard to the causality of God. His deity did not cause everything in the detail of the world-process, but was content to cause the main outlines of it and to secure the good outcome. Likewise his deity did not guarantee the goodness of the process in its detail, but the goodness of its outcome.¹ In respect of both power and goodness his deity compromised with men, by letting them operate with small unpredictable chances and permitting them to cause small goods and evils in that unpredictable fashion. If we consider the outcome, we find God's goodness evident and his causality paramount, with evil and chance behind. But if we consider the detail of the process, we find God's goodness mixed up with the known evil of things. Since chance was admitted in this locus, the evil could be ascribed to chance and not to God. But if God were omnipotent, he could have banished the chance, and if he were entirely good he would surely have omitted chance if he saw that it might produce evil. We are then brought to the question which has puzzled many a devout mind, and given sustenance to the sceptic: why should a good and omnipotent deity cause or permit evil in the world? The implications of the question for the freedom of the will are given by the facts that, to save the divine goodness, a causeless freedom might be ascribed to men; and to be consistent with the

¹Ibid.

power of God, such freedom might be denied to men.

Lossky held that God could not create free men if he created merely abstract determinations, for then the substantial kernel of personality would be the same as the empirical character, which was limited to abstract determinations, and there would be no freedom in the sense of uncaused activity by man. But the ego made by God was a super-qualitative self above abstract determinations and free.¹ The manifestations of this self were permitted by God, but their source was the self, which chose freely among the possibilities open to it. God created the best possible world in respect of the ultimate selves; but the processes in which these were active were brought about not by God, but by the selves; whence it was not true that the world, in respect of the process, was the best possible.² In criticism of Leibniz, Lossky had held that the best possible world would be one in which all creatures would use their freedom to realize good, and Leibniz did not explain why such a world was not chosen by God.³ We might ask Lossky why his best possible ultimate substances would not be such as would use their freedom well. When considering his own view, Lossky held that such a question trifled with the idea of freedom.⁴ But it might also be true that to speak of free substances as good or bad might be trifling with their uncaused activity. If the goodness or evil be ascribed to them in regard to their super-qualitative being, we would have nothing wherein to detail it, for all we know of good or evil can be brought to the level of abstract determinations. If the good or evil be ascribed in regard to the manifestations in experience, it would appear that from the standpoint of possibility each substance would be as good or bad as the next, for each would have the same range of possibilities; for real possibilities are assessed through laws and limited by them, and the removal of laws and thus of causality would remove the limits of possibility, and therefore differences between selves based on differences in possibilities. One self could have a differential possibility in regard to good, only if the other selves were more limited in that regard, and their

¹N. O. Lossky, Freedom of Will (London: Williams and Norgate, 1932), pp. 107-08.

²Ibid., pp. 111-12.

³Ibid., p. 110.

⁴Ibid., pp. 111-12.

limitation must imply a causal hindrance denied by the theory. From the standpoint of actualities enacted by the selves, differences obviously appear; but then the reference to the selves would have to be made after the fact, due to the impossibility of prediction of the actualities, and not at the prior point of creation.

Even then difficulties would arise, due to the problem of finding characters in the self which should answer to the good or evil manifested. There does not appear to be any assignable proportion between abstract determinations, found in the empirical process, and super-qualitative being, found in Lossky's substances. Windelband asked why the freely created beings should act differently, and thus show their freedom. The difference in their actions must come either from essences created differently, in which case God would be the cause of the difference in essence and thus of the difference in action; or from essences created indifferently and without individuality, in which case the difference in actions would have no cause in the essence and it would be accidental.¹ In view of this, we would have to assign the evil of the action either to God, as the cause of the essence causing the action, or to nothing, because of the gap between essence and varying action. The first alternative defeats the intent to assign causality and guilt to agents other than God. The second appears to succeed negatively in the intention, for God is not blamed; but it fails to show who is to blame. Such failure might be of small account, if the main intent is to show that God does not cause the evil of the world. But since it allows things to happen without the causality of God, it admits that power, or originative activity, may exist which is not of God. This appears to challenge his omnipotence.

If the substances have their undetermined activity in independence of the will of God, he would clearly have no power in the being or origin of that activity, which might run counter to his will. Then he would have no responsibility for the bad consequences of the activity. But if the undetermined activity be granted to the substances at his behest, as the notion of his creation of it implies, then one could argue to his primordial power at the point of creation, however one might question his subsequent power in the empirical process. Then the freedom would

¹Windelband, p. 167.

be his to refuse. A sufficient cause for refusal would be his knowledge of the bad use to which the freedom would be put. If we suppose a deity who purposes the good and the greatest good, and has power to create a determined series exhibiting the good or an undetermined series which exhibits evil, a contradiction appears between his capacity to do good and his refusal to do good. The contradiction disappears only if we insist that the undetermined series is better despite the evil choices and deeds it contains. The only trait to which we could appeal, in order to weigh the balance in favor of the undetermined series, is its undetermined character. We should have to suppose a value in uncaused activity, of an order and magnitude different from those of the particular acts and choices appearing as the content of both series. Now it might be possible, as we saw above, that free activity might have a good in itself, even if its consequences be bad. But we had occasion, perhaps wrongly, to deny that such good implied freedom of an undetermined activity, which is here in question. The types of freedom to which we assigned value did not involve uncaused status. It does not appear that we would care to exchange the definite values of our happiness and virtue, for the value of an undetermined activity which might bring neither of these. Since there does not seem to be any commensurability of the two kinds of value, of undetermined activity and of happiness, it would be open to the proponent of the former to hold that the presence of the former might fully compensate for the total loss of the latter. This seems improbable, if not patently absurd.

We see, then, that the reconciliation of power and goodness in deity implies a notion of what good may be which we may not care to accept. If we cannot effect the reconciliation, we may dispense with the belief in either the power or the goodness. The goodness is the basis for our interest and reverence; we could not let it go without severing ethics and theology. The power might be less necessary. The oughtness which attaches to moral value seems irrelevant to power. The uncaused activity which some have associated with it appears to negate the influence of the power. The happiness which most moralists make either the constitutive principle of good or the reward for it may require power for its fulfilment and preservation. This may be so; but the typical veneration of oughtness implies that it stems from something beyond happiness. But whether the good surpasses happiness

or not, the power of God would be useful or significant only if it should be directed (waiving a satanic conception of deity) to making us good or happy. Such direction would imply causal efficacy of God upon our volitions and the course of natural and social events. The power of God would be a good to us only if it could operate on events, and such operation implies causal efficacy. The power of God could promote virtue in us only if God could influence our characters, instead of leaving us to the uncertain choices of a will supposedly undetermined. It then appears that the power we might be led to deny for the sake of our belief in divine goodness, is a power we might need to assert for the sake of our belief in the efficacy of that goodness. The more power we may trace to God, the more confidence can we have that he will bend our wills to righteousness, provided he considers the right and the good to be as we consider them.

The foregoing argument has not attempted to throw conclusive light on the relation of God to human volition. It has been content to show that, if theological considerations imply undetermined volition, manifest difficulties arise in respect of value as well as of metaphysics; and that religious considerations may well point to the value of determined activity in the world. The determinism we have thought to be compatible with the kind of freedom we have accepted does not oppose the causality of God, or the influence of his goodness upon our volitions and characters provided he chooses to exert the influence. Nor are we persuaded that determinism has the pessimistic consequences envisioned by James, nor the teleological subservience objected to by Hartmann. A caused world may be subject to both kinds of objection, but not because of its causality alone. In view of these conclusions we think that religious value, as well as moral value, may be agreeable with our treatment of freedom, and demand of that freedom not an uncaused activity, but the causation of volition by abiding contents of the empirical self. We do not say this dogmatically. The problems involved are too many and too obscure to be handled dogmatically, and the means we have of dealing with them are not such as might justify great confidence.

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